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QUALITATIVE MATERIALITY: THE BIRTH,
STRUGGLES, AND DEMISE OF AN
UNWORKABLE STANDARD
John M. Fedders*
A quantitative standard of materiality traditionally has been employed
when making disclosure decisions under the federal securities laws. The
standard utilizes benchmarks of assets, earnings, and liabilities, and is
measured by amount, number, or percentage. Its application produces
reports of financial results and foreseeable material financial conse-
quences-information that is economically significant to investors.
In the 1970s, a qualitative standard of materiality was introduced by
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission").
The standard employed no definable benchmarks. The measurement
was by quality, kind, and essential character or conduct. The SEC
viewed unadjudicated violations of law, or even antisocial or unethical
conduct, as possible grounds for disclosure regardless of size or impact
on business because corporate officials were willing to engage in such
conduct.
The qualitative standard originated after the Watergate Special Prose-
cutor charged several corporations with making illegal political contribu-
tions to the Committee to Re-elect the President. After inquiry of the
SEC into whether and how the violations should be disclosed, it asked
how the companies accounted for the payments and whether the corpo-
rate boards, outside auditors, and investors knew of this use of corporate
assets. From 1974 to 1976, the SEC issued releases and a report focusing
on disclosure relating to management integrity and social matters, in and
of themselves, without concern as to the economic impact on a company.
The SEC sanctioned a voluntary disclosure program whereby over 500
companies conducted internal investigations for questionable or unadju-
dicated illegal conduct. The companies reported the results to investors,
although there were no injunctions requiring the investigations. The dis-
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closure ambiguities created by the SEC's public statements, and the fear
of reprisal by a civil injunctive action if the SEC uncovered such conduct,
motivated the corporations to undertake voluntary investigations and
disclosure.
While the SEC's invigorated war created uncertainty for those making
disclosure decisions, numerous benefits arose from its efforts. Economic
life became shaped more sharply by legal and moral principles. In 1977,
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act' was enacted, containing new re-
quirements that corporations maintain accurate books and records and
employ purposeful internal controls. It also embodied anti-bribery pro-
visions making it illegal to pay foreign officials in order to obtain or re-
tain business.
It was to the SEC's credit that it confronted the qualitative standard of
disclosure issue. However, the generalities of this standard obscured
more than they clarified disclosure obligations. Those trying to parse the
obligations concerning management integrity through the SEC's impre-
cise standard became vocal opponents of the new standard. Then, when
the SEC stubbornly refused to promulgate rules designed to fill in the de-
tails of a broadly stated qualitative standard of materiality, its initiatives
suffered fatal consequences.
Strange bedfellows combined to shatter the qualitative standard. In
1976, the United States Supreme Court defined a "material" fact as one
that would be "viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available."2 Despite the defi-
nition, there were no pressures from investors for corporate disclosure of
unadjudicated violations of law or antisocial conduct, or for ethical or
moral behavior at the corporate level. There was no evidence that inves-
tors even utilized qualitative information when making voting or invest-
ment decisions. Investors instead craved economic growth, and they
sought information that significantly affected a company's financial per-
formance and consequently translated into stock market gains or losses.
Between 1979 and 1997, federal courts in three civil cases and two
criminal cases held that the securities laws do not require management to
accuse itself of antisocial or illegal policies or conduct and that it was in-
appropriate for the SEC to use the securities laws to regulate corporate
conduct. One court said such a requirement "would make a silly, un-
workable rule."3 In 1985, during one of the criminal cases, the Director
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1994).
2. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976).
3. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp.
328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).
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of the SEC's Division of Enforcement testified about his assistance with
the business ethics investigation of the Southland Corporation ("South-
land") in 1977-78, while he had been a private attorney. The testimony
was at a Southland executive's trial for failing to disclose, in proxy mate-
rials soliciting his election as a director, that he had approved a cover-up
of a bribe payment to public officials. Then, in 1986, the SEC Director's
1982 speech4 abandoning the theory of qualitative materiality was cited
as an authority for the reversal of the executive's conviction.
In 1978, the SEC began an investigation of Citicorp to determine
whether it had failed to make qualitative disclosures of questionable for-
eign exchange parking transactions. In 1981, before the investigation was
concluded, a new SEC Chairman was appointed. Thereafter, based on
conflicting staff advice, the new Commission voted three to one not to
authorize an enforcement action against Citicorp. A leak of this non-
public decision triggered an investigation and hearings by a subcommit-
tee of the House of Representatives. The 1982-83 hearings trampled on
principle and stood on hypocrisy. The arguments in support of a qualita-
tive standard of materiality were so weak as to be meaningless. Those at
the SEC opposing an enforcement action against Citicorp were prom-
ised, but never given, an opportunity to testify before the subcommittee.
Rather than an intellectual sharing with Congress, the hearings sapped
any remaining momentum for a qualitative standard. They provided no
means for an intellectual resurrection of the standard.
Outside the congressional forum, SEC Commissioners and staff ex-
pressed their views about a qualitative standard of materiality. Most
Commission policymakers articulated a disclosure policy based on a
quantitative standard. Enforcement actions addressing mandated disclo-
sure were assured concerning loyalty and honesty to a corporate em-
ployer, including self-dealing or conflict of interest transactions and vio-
lations of the accounting and anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. However, in 1982, the SEC Director of Enforce-
ment reported that, absent clear rules, enforcement actions would not be
initiated against those who failed to disclose unadjudicated illegal acts or
immoral or unethical conduct, unless failure to disclose the conduct also
4. See John M. Fedders, Law Enforcement Against Those Who Fail to Disclose Ille-
gal Behavior, NEWS (SEC, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 29, 1982, at 9 [hereinafter Fedders Re-
marks] (remarks to a meeting of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the
American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law in
Washington, D.C., reprinted in LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 29,1982, at 19; 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 2035, 2057 (Nov. 26, 1982).
5. See United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1986).
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impacted traditional quantitative standards of materiality.
With the demise of the qualitative standard, energies must be devoted
to developing new disclosure techniques to provide financial information
to investors. If management consultants are correct and we are witness-
ing a profit migration away from products to services,6 the SEC should
foster means whereby corporations can report the economics of human
resources and the value of intellectual capital.
This article examines all of the foregoing, with emphasis on the life and
demise of the qualitative standard of materiality.
I. DISCLOSURE MANDATE OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS:
MATERIAL INFORMATION
Precipitated by the 1929 stock market collapse and the Great Depres-
sion, Congress established a system through which investors would be
provided information material to making investment decisions. It en-
acted the Securities Act of 1933' ("Securities Act"), instituting a regula-
tory scheme for the offer and sale of securities. Congress then estab-
lished the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 ("Exchange Act") to
eliminate fraudulent and manipulative practices in the securities markets.
The Exchange Act includes general antifraud provisions and affirmative
disclosure obligations pertaining to annual, periodic, and proxy reports.9
These Acts were premised on the view that investment and voting de-
cisions "should only be made on the basis of full disclosure of all infor-
mation necessary 'to bring into the full glare of publicity those elements
of real and unreal values which lie behind a security."" Each Act makes
it unlawful for reporting companies to disclose any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading." The Supreme Court, however, did not
define the term "material" until 1976.12 Even with the benefit of the
6. See ADRIAN J. SLYWOTZKY & DAVID J. MORRISON, THE PROFIT ZONE 17, 20-21
(1997).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77bbb (1994); see H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1-3 (1933).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 7811(1994).
9. See generally Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998); Exchange Act §§ 13,14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (1994).
10. George S. Branch & James A. Rubright, Integrity of Management Disclosures Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 1447, 1453 (1982) [hereinafter Branch] (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 85-73, at 1-2 (1933)) (address by President Franklin D. Roosevelt outlining his leg-
islative proposals).
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k to 771(1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
12. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (setting forth a definition
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definition, disclosure decisions are arduous.
A. Mandated Disclosure
The SEC has promulgated rules specifying information that must be
reported in various disclosure documents.13 The rules reflect the SEC's
judgment of what is material and germane to an evaluation of a com-
pany's business, earnings, and prospects. Most of those mandates relate
to quantitative information. For example, companies must describe their
business and properties and publish financial data. The mandated disclo-
sure requirements continue to increase. Since 1933, the requirements for
disclosing financially material information have expanded to include
company data by industry segment14 and the management's discussion
and analysis of financial condition and results of operations."
Among the mandated disclosure requirements are several that relate
to qualitative-like information, and reflect the SEC's judgment of what is
material to an evaluation of the competency and integrity of manage-
ment. They relate to a corporate official's loyalty and honesty to his em-
ployer. They require reporting of self-dealing transactions and conflicts
of interest with the employer. 6 They also require the reporting of crimi-
nal charges and convictions and any civil judgments involving violations
of the federal securities laws.17 The rules are clear and provide instruc-
tions to determine whether a particular disclosure is necessary. Other
than the duty to report a criminal proceeding, these mandated disclosure
rules do not address unadjudicated violations of law or unethical or anti-
social management behavior. Complying with the SEC's disclosure
mandates is akin to following assembling instructions. Scrupulous ad-
herence to directions is the prescription for success.
B. Quantitative Materiality and the Leap to a Qualitative Standard
Often it is difficult to determine whether a fact, not mandated to be
disclosed by an SEC rule, is otherwise material to the total mix of infor-
of "material").
13. See, e.g., Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. pt. 228 (1998) (disclosure for small business issu-
ers); Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (requisite contents of certain disclosure forms); Regu-
lation S-X, 17 C.F.R. pt. 210 (statements regarding company financials).
14. See Item 101 of SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101.
15. See Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
16. See, e.g., Item 404 of SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (requiring the report-
ing of the details of transactions in which certain relationships exist).
17. See, e.g., Item 401(f) of SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (requiring the re-
porting of certain legal proceedings regarding those who are, or are nominated to be, corpo-
rate officials).
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mation and thus required to be disclosed. Nonetheless, the task of
evaluating facts and drafting disclosure language is the grueling chore of
preparing prospectuses and periodic reports.
From 1933 to the 1970s, materiality decisions were almost always
based on quantitative facts. Then, in the 1970s, the SEC introduced the
notion of qualitative materiality. This new theory adopted the idea that
if conduct was illegal, the illegality itself would be of import and material,
even if the conduct itself was not financially significant to the company.18
The stretch to qualitative materiality and disclosures regarding manage-
ment integrity was unlike any previously proposed SEC rule mandating
expanded disclosure. This initiative raised the question "whether, and
under what circumstances, [can] the Commission ... as a matter of
authority, and should [the Commission] as a matter of intelligence and
discretion, compel disclosure of information not rooted in economic ma-
teriality, but bearing on the integrity of management." 19
The struggle to determine whether a fact is qualitatively material is
more difficult than making determinations of quantitative materiality.
Economic or quantitative materiality is characterized by facts that sig-
nificantly affect a company's financial performance and, consequently, its
stock price. The disclosure determinations are made by measuring the
amount, number, or percentage of assets, earnings, or liabilities. While
judgments of quantitative materiality may be reached objectively without
surmise, the means to reach qualitative determinations of materiality en-
compass subjective components and judgments and have almost no rela-
tionship to the financial condition of a company.2° Determinations as to
whether management conduct is qualitatively material are measured by
quality, kind, and essential character or conduct. Those decisions cannot
be made simply by employing arithmetic. Reasonable people will differ
in their views as to whether qualitative information is material. This is a
chief reason why the SEC's efforts in the 1970s to establish a qualitative
standard met with an explosion of denunciation. Moreover, few believed
18. See Milton V. Freeman, The Legality of the SEC's Management Fraud Program, 31
Bus. LAW. 1295, 1296 (1976) [hereinafter Freeman] (comparing economic materiality with
qualitative materiality and explaining the development of the latter).
19. Bevis Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regarding Management Integrity, NEWS
(SEC, Wash., D.C.) Oct. 18, 1982, at 2 [hereinafter Longstreth] (remarks delivered by the
Commissioner of the SEC to the Investor Responsibility Research Center in New York City),
reprinted in 38 Bus. LAW. 1413, 1414 (1983) (discussing the context in which the SEC requires
disclosure of information).
20. See Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management Integ-
rity and Competency, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 606 (1981) [hereinafter Ferrara] (discussing the




that this new information would influence investors' voting or decisions
regarding securities transactions.
II. FAILURES TO DISCLOSE DISLOYALTY OR DISHONESTY TO THE
CORPORATE EMPLOYER
The SEC's qualitative materiality initiatives must not be confused with
its enforcement actions addressing failure to report self-dealing or con-
flict of interest transactions. While both types of action relate to man-
agement integrity, the latter pertains to disclosure concerning loyalty and
honesty to a corporate employer.21 Such disclosures are mandated.
Three cases amply distinguish actions for failure to disclose self-dealing
from actions to enforce the 1970s qualitative materiality standard.
In In re Franchard Corporation,22 the SEC determined that registration
statements were materially deficient in their failure to disclose that the
chief executive officer ("CEO") used company funds for personal bene-
fit.23 The Commission concluded that the omitted information rendered
misleading several affirmative statements regarding the CEO's reputa-
tion." Although the CEO's withdrawals for personal benefit never ex-
ceeded 1.5% of the corporation's total assets, the Commission reasoned
that the withdrawals were material information subject to disclosure be-
cause they were "germane to an evaluation of the integrity of his man-
agement. '2' It defined management integrity as management's "willing-
ness to place its duty to public shareholders over personal interest."26
The SEC thus emphasized management's duty of loyalty to shareholders
and expressed no desire to regulate the moral or ethical character of
management conduct unrelated to the financial benefit of shareholders.27
21. See, e.g., In re SEC v. Kalvex Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Franchard
Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 170-71 (1964); see also Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The SEC and the New
Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 51-52 (1976).
22. 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964).
23. See id. at 171 & n.20.
24. See id. at 169; see also Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 153 (1972) (omitting information that would have influenced plaintiffs to sell their
stock); Zell v. Intercapital Income Sec., Inc., 675 F.2d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 1982) (omitting
information in proxy statement deemed material to approving investment management
agreements); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 713-14 (2d Cir. 1978) (withholding
adverse information that was material to an accurate appraisal of the company's future).
25. See Franchard, 42 S.E.C. at 172.
26. See id. at 170 (stating that the information necessary to evaluate management in-
tegrity raises the question whether the conduct involved transactions "financially mate-
rial" to the company).
27. See Branch, supra note 10, at 1458 (defining integrity of management as manage-
ment's willingness to put shareholders' needs before personal interests); see also United
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
In SEC v. Kalvex Inc.," the court found that failure to disclose partici-
pation by the company's senior officers in a kickback scheme channeling
corporate funds for personal use violated the proxy rules of the Ex-
change Act." The Kalvex court, like the SEC in Franchard, equated
management integrity with loyalty to the corporation and its sharehold-
ers.3" The Kalvex court described management integrity as an unwilling-
ness to use the corporation for personal gain.31
In Maldonado v. Flynn,32 the court distinguished between the nondis-
closure of self-dealing by a corporate director and the failure to disclose
transactions that were intended for the corporation's benefit and lacked
any element of self-dealing.33 The case involved "directors using inside
information to gain substantial personal benefits at the Corporation's
expense."34 Because the transactions involved self-dealing, the court con-
cluded they were "directly relevant to a determination of whether [the
directors were] qualified to exercise stewardship of the company," and
hence were material.3 ' The court arrived at this conclusion by contrasting
the immediate case with cases involving claims where, in an effort to
benefit the corporation, directors failed to disclose that they had ap-
proved "illegal foreign payments."36 The latter accusation, absent an al-
legation of self-dealing, was found to charge mere mismanagement.
While mismanagement properly may be the subject of a state law cause
of action grounded on corporate waste, the court found such an action
inappropriate under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. 7
These three cases reflect the significance of management loyalty to
States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 649 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding kickback transactions to be a ma-
terial fact, such that failure to disclose them could mislead a reasonable investor in his in-
vestment decision); cf. SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 225 (6th Cir.
1982) (finding kickbacks paid in conjunction with a municipal bond offering to be a mate-
rial fact because knowledge of them could have altered a reasonable investor's decision to
purchase the bond); General Steel Indus., Inc. v. Walco Nat'l Corp., 527 F. Supp. 305
(E.D. Mo. 1981) (involving a claim that officers omitted material facts in a tender offer).
28. 425 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
29. See id. at 314-15; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994); Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-101 (1998); id. §§ 240.14a-3, 240.14a-9.
30. See Kalvex, 425 F. Supp. at 315.
31. See id.; see also Branch, supra note 10, at 1460 (comparing discussions of man-
agement integrity in Franchard and Kalvex).
32. 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).
33. See id. at 796.
34. Id. at 791.
35. Id. at 796.
36. Id.; see also Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650, 654-55 (2d Cir.
1979) (citing United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1978)).
37. See Maldonado, 597 F.2d at 796.
[Vol. 48:41
Qualitative Materiality
shareholders and compliance with the SEC's mandated disclosure rules.
The holdings did not evidence concern about the ethical ramifications of
management actions unrelated to the economic condition of the com-
pany and mandated disclosure.
III. WATERGATE AND THE DAWN OF A QUALITATIVE MATERIALITY
STANDARD
In early 1973, the Watergate Special Prosecutor announced that volun-
tary and prompt disclosure by corporations of Federal Election Cam-
paign Act violations would be considered mitigating circumstances when
determining what charges to initiate against such companies.3 ' By mid-
year, several enterprises came forward and revealed their activities vio-
lated the Act; criminal informations followed.39
There were inquiries of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance as
to how the violations should be disclosed.4° As the scope of the disclo-
sures were discussed at the Commission, then under the chairmanship of
G. Bradford Cook, inquiries were made by the Division of Enforcement
into the facts underlying the criminal cases charging illegal political pay-
ments. The SEC's staff asked the companies' officials how they ac-
counted for the payments, and whether the corporate boards, independ-
ent auditors, and investors knew of this use of assets.4 ' The enforcement
staff concluded that there had been violations of the federal securities
laws by falsification of financial records to conceal illegal payments and
42by the existence of undisclosed "slush" funds to make such payments.
A. SEC 1974 Release
After inquiries to the Division of Corporate Finance concerning dis-
closure of illegal campaign contributions, the Division published a re-
lease ("1974 Release") detailing its conclusions.43 The SEC announced
38. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 1296, 1302 (explaining the history of the develop-
ment of qualitative materiality).
39. See id. at 1296.
40. See id. (stating that the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance responded to in-
quiries concerning disclosure of violations of the campaign contribution laws).
41. See William R. McLucas et al., Common Sense, Flexibility, and Enforcement of the
Federal Securities Laws, 51 Bus. LAW. 1221, 1223 (1995); see also Lisa Harriman Randall,
Multilateralization of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 657,
658 & n.1 (1997).
42. See McLucas, supra note 41, at 1223.
43. See Securities Act Release No. 5466, SEC Docket 648, 648 (Mar. 8,1974) [herein-
after 1974 Release]; Freeman, supra note 18, at 1296. The SEC Chairman at that time was
Ray Garrett, Jr., who served from August 1973 to October 1975.
19981
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that a conviction for such a contribution is
a material fact that should be disclosed to the public ... par-
ticularly in ... a proxy statement where shareholders are being
asked to vote for management. Such a conviction is material to
an evaluation of the integrity of the management ... as it re-
lates to the operation of the corporation and the use of corpo-
rate funds."
The 1974 Release also addressed disclosure of political contributions
which might be illegal, but which had not yet been the subject of a formal
proceeding.45 Thereby, the SEC for the first time officially broached the
topic of disclosure of unadjudicated violations of law. The release de-
clared that, "[i]n such cases, management is usually in the best position to
inquire into, to examine and weigh the facts and circumstances and to de-
termine whether disclosure is necessary." 46
Management and its attorneys grappled with the view that "possibly
illegal" contributions might require public disclosure. A debate ensued
about whether, if possibly illegal political contributions required disclo-
sure, unadjudicated illegal activities associated with commercial transac-
tions also required disclosure.47 Because of failures to disclose unadjudi-
cated violations, "[s]uits were brought by the Commission demanding
disclosure of payments as to which there had been no indictments.,
4
1
These suits illustrate the SEC's abandonment of its previously declared
view that corporate management was best situated to make disclosure
determinations about unadjudicated conduct.
49
B. The SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program
By early 1975, the SEC began focusing on bribes by corporations and
their agents to foreign officials to obtain or retain business, and other
"questionable practices."50 The inquiries revealed that many companies,
44. 1974 Release, supra note 43, at 648; see also Freeman, supra note 18, at 1296-97
(explaining how the SEC's new policy requiring disclosure of possibly unlawful political
contributions altered the traditional concept of disclosure).
45. See 1974 Release, supra note 43, at 648 (discussing disclosure of alleged violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 610); Freeman, supra note 18, at 1296-97.
46. 1974 Release, supra note 43, at 648.
47. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 1297 (explaining efforts to comply with the 1974
Release and its disclosure principles).
48. Id.; see also SEC Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and
Practices, 642 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) pt. II, B-10 to B-12, B-16 to B-20 (May 19, 1976)
[hereinafter 1976 Report] (documenting suits filed against Minnesota Mining and Manu-
facturing Corp. and Northrop Corp., respectively).
49. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 1297.
50. See generally McLucas, supra note 41, at 1223-25 (describing the development
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including large enterprises, falsified records to conceal corrupt practices
and often employed schemes to hide the payments from auditors." As a
result of the initiatives, an undefined theory of "ethical materiality" de-
veloped concerning the quality and integrity of management and ac-
counting controls, earnings, and assets. This theory became the bedrock
for the qualitative materiality standard. But the idea of a broad qualita-
tive materiality concept cut against the rule of law. This standard would
prove to be a source of mischief and great harm to the established system
of disclosure.
At the time, no United States law or SEC regulation prohibited illegal
foreign payments. Yet, the Division of Enforcement instituted a pro-
gram to promote disclosure of corporate disbursements of questionable
legality, thereby creating an indirect method to discourage the practice of
52questionable foreign payments. The SEC asserted that a company
could not fulfill its disclosure obligations under the securities laws, and its
duty to file accurate financial statements, "while maintaining off-the-
books slush funds and making questionable payments" improperly
documented in accounting records.53
In 1975, the SEC initiated injunctive actions alleging that corporate
books were falsified in order to conceal questionable or illegal activities.54
Several months later, the Division of Enforcement determined that the
magnitude of the problem required an additional disclosure mechanism
to supplement these lawsuits.55 Under the leadership of Stanley Sporkin,
then Director of Enforcement and widely regarded for his startling law
enforcement virility, the SEC encouraged voluntary disclosure of illegal
or questionable payments and practices by urging companies to conduct
56independent, internal investigations. Corporations with problems con-
and implementation of the SEC's Foreign Payments Program following Watergate).
51. See id. at 1223.
52. See Randall, supra note 41, at 660.
53. McLucas, supra note 41, at 1224.
54. See id. at 1224. In its actions, the SEC alleged violations of the antifraud, report-
ing, books and records and proxy solicitation provisions of the Exchange Act. See id. at
1224 n.13; see also Theodore A. Levine, Commission Enforcement Actions, in BRIBES,
KICKBACKS AND ILLEGAL PAYMENTS: SEC & IRS REQUIREMENTS 50, 50-56 (Lynn S.
Glasser ed., 1976) (listing those companies investigated by the SEC and the resulting judi-
cial action).
55. See Randall, supra note 41, at 661.
56. See McLucas, supra note 41, at 1224-25. The SEC announced the use of the vol-
untary program to augment judicial proceedings. See id. at 1224 n.16; see also Randall,
supra note 41, at 661-63 (discussing the impetus for the SEC's new program, general pro-
cedures, and benefits of participation). See generally The Activities of American Multina-
tional Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy of the
House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong. 57-58, 63-64, 180-81 (1975) (statement of SEC
19981
Catholic University Law Review
cerning questionable payments could meet their disclosure obligations by
authorizing an independent investigation and disclosing the material re-
suits in reports filed with the SEC. Each volunteer also was required to
provide the Division of Enforcement with access to the report of its in-
57vestigative counsel and the underlying documentation. The SEC an-
nounced further that those companies finding questionable activities
should terminate the practices and implement a policy prohibiting them.
The process trapped corporations into lengthy probes of conduct that
professional prosecutors were not likely to pursue. Consequently, the
program removed the important check of prosecutorial discretion.
Although the SEC formally stated that participation in its program did
not insulate a company from an enforcement action, such participation
greatly diminished the probability of an agency proceeding.5 8 Companies
were motivated to comply with the program by this fact and by the dis-
closure ambiguities of the SEC's public statements and the fear of an in-
vestigation and civil injunctive action if the government independently
learned of corrupt conduct. 9 As a result, corporate America acquiesced
to the SEC's novel and statutorily questionable disclosure initiative.6
Before 1980, over 450 companies publicly reported the results of their
inquiries.6' An indeterminate number, believed to be several hundred,
conducted investigations without making any public report. The public
reports revealed that hundreds of millions of dollars had been disbursed
for bribes, payoffs, or kickbacks.6 ' These reports disclosed that falsifica-
tion of corporate books and the existence of secret slush funds were not
isolated problems among multi-national corporations. Rather, bribery
had been an integral part of international commerce. The SEC's efforts,
and those of the volunteers, exposed that corporate legal and ethical
Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, Jr.).
57. See Randall, supra note 41, at 662. Recent court decisions reveal, however, that
the confidentiality of these reports is uncertain. See In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430, 441
(6th Cir. 1997); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Willkie Farr & Gallagher, M8-85
(JSM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2927, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997) (eliminating the privi-
lege protection afforded to reports of outside counsel in connection with internal investi-
gations once the conclusions underlying those reports have been disclosed to outsiders).
58. See McLucas, supra note 41, at 1225; see also Randall, supra note 41, at 661-63
(explaining the various benefits available to corporations electing to participate in the vol-
untary program).
59. See Branch, supra note 10, at 1465 (noting the Commission combined the pro-
gram's "subjective and judicially untested interpretations of materiality together with tra-
ditional economic anaylses of the activities in question").
60. See id. (reasoning why hundreds of corporations opted for disclosure despite judi-
cial criticism of the program's authority).
61. See id. at 1463; Randall, supra note 41, at 663 n.25.
62. See Randall, supra note 41, at 663; see also Branch, supra note 10, at 1463.
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principles had deteriorated beyond anyone's expectation. Yet, the dis-
closures of illegalities were of no consequence to investors who generally
were ambivalent to punishment for the wrongdoers.
No definitive conclusions can be drawn by comparing the reported re-
sults of the investigations. The criteria employed to determine whether a
particular course of conduct was "questionable," "illegal," or both, and
therefore required to be publicly reported, varied markedly among the
companies. Some corporations searched for particular corrupt practices
not even reviewed by others. Others reported any activity that met their
criteria for "questionable," including conclusions based on conjecture.
Still other companies reported no activity unless they were able to con-
clude beyond a reasonable doubt that it was both illegal and susceptible
to prosecution.
The differences among activities reported as "questionable" or "ille-
gal" also varied by reason of the structure and methodology of the inves-
tigations.63 In some instances, corporate boards, audit committees, and
special committees of the board directed investigations. Most often the
corporation's regular outside counsel conducted the inquiry. However,
more independent investigations occurred under the direction of outside
counsel who had no prior relationship with the corporation. Conversely,
less independent investigations were conducted by in-house counsel. In
a few circumstances, auditors managed the inquiry. The methodology of
the investigations varied dramatically. 6 Most investigations utilized
questionnaires followed by interviews or depositions. Some of the inter-
viewees were prohibited from having counsel in attendance, although
others were required to have counsel. Some companies followed the
practice that no one outside its employ would be questioned. Those
conducting the investigations had neither subpoena power nor the ability
61to sanction perjury.
Although the SEC initiated the voluntary program, it was the partici-
pation of hundreds of corporations that rendered it successful. They
willingly spent millions of dollars for legal fees, and incurred the disrup-
tion of their business activities, to investigate themselves. The SEC
could not have investigated and sued a fraction of the volunteers.
63. See John M. Fedders, Corporate Criminal Responsibility-Conducting an Internal
Investigation, in 3A CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES §62.05[2], at 62-38 to 62-39 (Liliana
Perillo & Juliet Turner eds., 1998).
64. See id. § 62.02, at 62-11.
65. See id. § 62.06, at 62-40.
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C. SEC 1975 Release
In the midst of promoting its voluntary program, the SEC issued a
rulemaking proposal contradicting its prior statements concerning disclo-
sure of unadjudicated questionable conduct. The release concerned dis-
closure of environmental and other matters of social concern, including
equal employment matters. The October 1975 release66 ("1975 Release")
tacitly acknowledged that the range of information suggested for inclu-
sion in prospectuses and public reports was virtually infinite. It listed
over 100 social and ethical concerns recommended for disclosure, in-
cluding corporate policy on employment discrimination, political contri-
butions, the Arab boycott, and internal managerial procedures, which
necessarily implicated management ability and integrity.67 The release
acknowledged that there existed substantial disagreement about the sig-
nificance of such information to investors, and serious difficulties in dis-
closing the information meaningfully and fairly. The SEC reported it
would not require disclosure of violations of the laws against employ-
ment discrimination and concluded the following:
[T]he primary interest of investors is economic. After all, the
principal, if not the only reason why people invest their money
in securities is to obtain a return. A variety of other motives are
probably present in the investment decisions of numerous in-
vestors but the only common thread is the hope for a satisfac-
tory return, and it is to this that a disclosure scheme intended to
be useful to all must be primarily addressed. 68
The 1975 Release should have provided comfort that illegal employ-
ment practices, like other illegal social behavior, did not warrant disclo-
sure. Yet, it did not provide solace because at the time of the 1975 Re-
lease, the SEC staff was initiating lawsuits and accepting consent decrees,
thus compelling disclosure of questionable or unlawful acts concerning
these same "social matters., 69 In apparent contradiction to the policy
stated in the 1975 Release, the SEC continued to focus on disclosures
relating to management integrity and social matters, regardless of their
economic impact on the disclosing companies. This contradiction raised
speculation concerning the Commission's reasons for publishing one
66. Proposed Environmental Disclosures, Exchange Act Release. No. 11733, [1975-76
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,310, at 85,706 (Oct. 14, 1975) [hereinafter
1975 Release].
67. See id. at 85,724 & n.72. The 1975 Release listed over one hundred "social mat-
ters" that would require disclosure, the SEC asserted, if disclosure of unlawful employ-
ment activities was warranted. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 1298.
68. 1975 Release, supra note 66, at 85,721.
69. See id. at 85,724; see also Freeman, supra note 18, at 1298.
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policy, yet acting in contravention to it.7° One commentator reasoned
that companies would rather submit to the SEC's demands than risk dep-
rivation of access to the markets and shareholders.7
D. May 1976 Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments
and Practices
In a Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and
Practices ("1976 Report") to the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Committee, the SEC presented the results of its investigations
concerning questionable foreign payments and its actions toward recti-
fying falsification of records and financials. The report described the
SEC's voluntary disclosure program and offered legislative and other
proposals. The 1976 Report documented the change from the congres-
sionally mandated SEC policy requiring corporate disclosure of quantita-
tively material information to a broader initiative mandating the disclo-
sure of information deemed qualitatively material.73
E. SEC Rulemaking Authority
The rulemaking provisions of the securities laws grant the SEC the
70. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 1301-03.
71. See id. at 1302-03.
72. See generally Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Question-
able and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, Submitted to the Senate Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Comm., 642 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), pt. II (May 19, 1976)
[hereinafter 1976 Report]. The Introduction stated that the purpose of the SEC's action in
the area of questionable payments was "to restore the efficacy of the system of corporate
accountability and to encourage the boards of directors to exercise their authority to deal
with the issue [of questionable payments]." Id. at b. The SEC Chairman at that time was
Roderick M. Hills, who served from October 1975 to April 1977.
73. See generally id. at 1-56 (setting forth the substance of the SEC's disclosure pol-
icy). The 1976 Report expressed the Commission's view that
questionable or illegal payments, if unknown to the board of directors, could be
grounds for disclosure regardless of the size of the payment itself or its impact on
dependent business because the fact that corporate officials have been willing to
make repeated illegal payments without board knowledge and without proper
accounting raises questions regarding improper exercise of corporate authority
and may also be a circumstance relevant to the 'quality of management' that
should be disclosed to the shareholders.
Id. at 15; Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The SEC and Foreign Bribery, 32 BUs. LAW. 53, 69
(1976) (describing the goals of the legislation). In pursuit of this goal, the 1976 Report in-
cluded proposed legislation requiring registrants to keep books and accounts that "fairly
reflect" the company's transactions and disposition of assets. See 1976 Report, supra note
48, at 63-64. The goal of the proposed legislation was to establish internal accounting pro-
cedures and prohibit both the falsification of accounting records and the making of false or
misleading statements to accountants in connection with the completion of audits. See id.
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authority to require the disclosure of information "necessary to carry out
the provisions" of the federal securities laws.74 In addition, the Commis-
sion is able to prescribe rules "as ...necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors. 7 1 Irrespective of this
broad statutory language, the SEC has interpreted its congressional
mandate narrowly, acknowledging that the primary focus of its disclosure
requirements is to compel companies to provide "economically signifi-
cant" information. These, and other disclosure requirements, are con-
sistent with the Commission's stated purpose of the protection of inves-
tors and the "furtherance of fair, orderly and informed securities
markets.,
77
As to the voluntary program and the attendant qualitative materiality
initiatives, commentators argued that the Division of Enforcement im-
properly stretched the parameters of the SEC's mandate and required
disclosure solely for the purpose of prescribing corporate conduct.
7 8
Critics asserted that not only did the voluntary program force the SEC to
violate its statutory mandate, but it inappropriately claimed jurisdiction
to police "corporate morality., 79 In other words, the SEC "imprecisely
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1994); see also id. §§ 77a to 77aa; §§ 78a to 78kk.
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(g), 77j(c); see also id. §§ 78(b), 78m(a), and 78n(a) (limiting the
Commission's rulemaking authority to information "as necessary or appropriate for the
proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the security").
76. See Ferrara, supra note 20, at 557; see also 1975 Release, supra note 66, 80,310,
at 85,710 (stating that "[tihe Acts and the relevant legislative history also suggest that a
prime expectation of the Congress was that the Commission's disclosure authority would
be used to require the dissemination of information which is or may be economically sig-
nificant"). In addition, the Senate draft of the Exchange Act stated that "'nothing in this
title shall be construed as authorizing the Commission to interfere with the management
of the affairs of an issuer."' H.R. REP. No. 73-1838, at 35 (1934); Homer Kripke, The SEC,
Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173, 174 n.2 (1981).
77. 1975 Release, supra note 66, 85,713 (stating that "although the Commission's
discretion to require disclosure is broad, its exercise of authority is limited to contexts re-
lated to the objectives of the federal securities laws").
78. See generally Kripke, supra note 76 (advocating that corporate governance should
stem from new legislation; reform cannot emerge from "imaginative interpretations" of
the securities laws); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 702 (1974). Former SEC Commissioner Roberta S. Karmel
described the foreign payments program as a "witch hunt" reaction to Watergate, and
maintained that the SEC imposed its own rules of morality on corporations, an action out-
side the scope of the federal securities laws. See McLucas, supra note 41, at 1225 (citing
ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 158 (1982)). Those who supported
the SEC's initiative claimed that a narrow reading of the statutes precluding the concept of
qualitative materiality would have caused bribery and questionable payments to prolifer-
ate. See id.
79. See Kripke, supra note 76, at 188 (stating that the SEC had "become a Don Qui-
xote, a Sir Galahad, a Phantom, or a Superman seeking to right all sorts of wrongs ...
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redefine[d]" the concept of materiality to promote the importance of
management's integrity as a justification for mandatory disclosure of
questionable payments, irrespective of whether this disclosure was within
the purview of the securities laws. 80 As a result of this approach, com-
mentators also debated whether the deterrence of immoral conduct was
a proper goal of the securities laws and, accordingly, of the SEC.8'
F. The SEC's Civil Injunctive Actions Alleging Corrupt Activities: The
Settled Actions
Between mid-1974 and 1978, the SEC filed multiple civil injunctive ac-
tions82 alleging violations of the federal securities laws by reason of a fail-
ure to disclose corrupt practices. Most of the defendant companies
promptly consented to the injunctions and made various undertakings.
It is clear from a hindsight study of those complaints that, for the most
part, the alleged facts failed to support the charged violations of the se-
curities laws under the prevailing law after 1979. For example, often
there were no facts supporting allegations that disclosure of the omitted
information was mandated by any SEC rule or schedule. There were no
allegations that any corporate official self-dealt by receiving an undis-
closed bribe or kickback. Frequently, there were no supporting allega-
tions that the information the individual corporations allegedly failed to
disclose was economically material to the well-being of the corporation
or its shareholders. Finally, there were no allegations that the economic
investments of the corporation's shareholders were harmed. If anything,
the shareholders benefited from the alleged corrupt payments inasmuch
as the practices resulted in increased business for the corporation. Con-
sequently, each action was based solely on the theory of qualitative ma-
teriality.
whether or not the wrongs were within the compass of the federal securities laws").
80. Id. (criticizing the SEC for its policing of "corporate morality" in the corrupt
practices context, and for exhibiting no recognition of a distinction between management's
improper self-dealing and misconduct resulting from management's belief that they were
acting in the corporation's best interest). Other commentators suggested that, under tradi-
tional theories of financial or quantitative materiality, disclosure of foreign payments is
required "only where management is aware of the payments and the payments entail sig-
nificant possibilities of legal penalties." THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN PAYMENTS, REPORT ON
QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS BY CORPORATIONS: THE PROBLEM AND
APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION 21 (1977).
81. See Kripke, supra note 76, at 188 (stating that the SEC's statutory authority to
pursue its voluntary disclosure program fell short of the goals set by the SEC in the 1976
Report).
82. See generally 1976 Report, supra note 48.
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IV. JUNE 1976: TSC INDUSTRIES, INC. V. NORTHWAY, INC.-
MATERIALITY DEFINED
In June 1976, twenty-six days after the SEC issued its 1976 Report, the
Supreme Court defined the term "material" as used in the Exchange
Act's proxy rules. In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,83 the Court
addressed an action brought by a shareholder claiming that TSC's proxy
statement was materially misleading in violation of Exchange Act section
14(a) and Rules 14a-3 and 14a-9 promulgated thereunder, and incom-
plete because it failed to state that the transfer of interests in TSC had
resulted in a change of control.84 In defining a standard of materiality,
the Court reasoned that
[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote .... What the standard ... contemplate[s]
is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the cir-
cumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual signifi-
cance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put
another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the dis-
closure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the rea-
sonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix"
of information made available.85
The Supreme Court's materiality definition begged the question
whether the SEC would have pursued with such compulsive vigor its cor-
rupt practices initiatives if the TSC opinion had been rendered in 1972.
The fact is that "reasonable shareholders" responded with apathy to the
reports of corrupt practices. There is no evidence that they attached "ac-
tual significance" to the questionable payments reports in the "total mix"
86of information available when voting or making investment decisions.
83. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
84. See id. at 441-43.
85. Id. at 449.
86. In 1988, the Supreme Court applied the materiality standard established in TSC
to the anti-fraud provisions and to the context of discussions surrounding mergers. See
generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The Court ruled that the existence
of preliminary merger discussions may amount to a material fact, and that the parties to
the discussions do not have to reach an "agreement-in-principle as to price and structure"
to render such discussions material as a matter of law. Id. at 236. The Court held that the
materiality of preliminary merger discussions must be decided on a case-by-case basis and
involves the balancing of the "probability" that the merger will take place against the
"magnitude" or significance of the merger to the corporation. Id. at 239. When deter-
mining the materiality of unadjudicated illegal conduct in light of Basic, the test for disclo-
sure involves the balancing of the "probability" that there will be a criminal or civil action
against the "magnitude" of the economic consequences to the corporation if there is a
conviction or adverse finding.
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V. POST-MAY 1976: JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO QUALITATIVE
MATERIALITY ALLEGATIONS
Although corporations reacted with fear and compliance to the SEC's
voluntary program, challenges and litigation still arose.87 Only a few
courts adopted the SEC's interpretation of qualitative materiality. By
1981, the prevailing decisions refocused on the traditional economic ma-
teriality standard and rejected a qualitative standard.
8 8
SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.89 is often cited as support for the
qualitative materiality theory. The court permitted an SEC complaint, in
which three million dollars of improper payments were alleged, to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss. Schlitz argued the payments were immaterial
when measured against 1976 net sales of $1 billion. Although the court
stated that "the question of the integrity of management gives materiality
to the matters the Commission claims should have been disclosed,"90 its
unwillingness to dismiss the section 14(a) claim rested equally on the
conclusion that the payments in question may have proved to be eco-
nomically material. The illegal payments alleged in Schlitz also were the
subject of a pending criminal proceeding, bringing that action within the
The accounting industry also has developed qualitative characteristics for determining
materiality of financial information. See QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF
ACCOUNTING INFORMATION, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 (Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board 1980) [hereinafter CON 2]. CON 2 addresses the issue of
materiality judgments. It indicates that the nature of the judgment item in question and
the attendant circumstances should be considered, but notes that materiality judgments
are primarily quantitative in nature. See id. 123. It also comments that the materiality
threshold may be lower if the item turns a loss into a profit or reverses the trend of earn-
ings from a downward to an upward trend. See id. $ 128(b). Conversely, when the item,
error, or omission does not affect such a trend, the materiality threshold may be higher.
See id. APB Opinion No. 20, paragraph 38, states that "[miateriality should be considered
in relation to both the effects of each change separately and the combined effect of the
changes." ACCOUNTING CHANGES, APB Opinion No. 20, 38 (Financial Accounting
Standards Board 1971) [hereinafter ACCOUNTING CHANGES]. CON 2 further states that,
in almost every case, "the relative rather than the absolute size of a judgment item deter-
mines whether it should be considered material in a given situation." CON 2, supra. The
materiality threshold for judging items in quarterly interim reports is higher than that of
fiscal years. CON 2 also establishes that in determining the materiality of a judgment item,
it is highly useful to assess the item in the context of historical trends.
87. See-Ferrara, supra note 20, at 565 (drawing conclusions from pertinent case law
decided before, during, and after the voluntary program regarding when liability would
arise).
88. See id. at 567 (discussing the courts' varied responses to disclosure of company
information relating to management competency and integrity).
89. 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
90. Id. at 830. The court accepted the SEC's argument that the small payments were
material because it believed that further discovery might reveal that the payments were
much larger than three million dollars. See Branch, supra note 10, at 1466-67.
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disclosure mandates of the Exchange Act.9" Although the SEC argued
that the payments were quantitatively material and subject to disclosure,
the decision is not clear upon which of the SEC's arguments (i.e., quanti-
tative or qualitative materiality) the holding is based.92 Later courts dis-
tinguished Schlitz on the ground that it involved known misconduct that
also was quantitatively material.
Berman v. Gerber Products Co.9' involved a company's failure to dis-
close bribes in tender offer disclosure documents. The target company
argued that the offeror failed to disclose information regarding question-
able payments in its offering materials in violation of Exchange Act sec-
tion 14(e).94 The court reasoned that the questionable payments might
bear on management integrity and, therefore, may be disclosable, but
found that their omission from the tender offer material was not materi-
ally misleading.
The court concluded that "none of the contentions... involve[d] suffi-
cient allegations of deception to state a claim under section 14(e)." ' It
also explained that pursuit of this information was a question of misman-
agement unrelated to a tender offer. Moreover, under the Supreme
Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,96 breach of fiduciary
duty without deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure is excluded
from the disclosure obligations of section 14(e). 97
In Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens &
91. See Branch, supra note 10, at 1466. The Schlitz court noted, however, that the
Commission was not acting beyond its authority and that the securities laws must be inter-
preted "'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial pur-
poses."' Schlitz, 452 F. Supp. at 828 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 195 (1963)); see also id. at 831 (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 450 (1976)).
92. See Branch, supra note 10, at 1468 (explaining that the Schlitz court did not state
the extent to which its holding was premised upon management integrity, economic mate-
riality, and/or proceedings then pending before the Department of the Treasury's Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms).
93. 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
94. See id. at 1314-15.
95. Id. at 1318.
96. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
97. See Berman, 454 F. Supp. at 1318 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977)); see also Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing
Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 462); In re Wyse Tech Sec. Litig., 1990 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,509, at 97,682, 97,684 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1990) ("[lIt is well settled that de-
fendants do not violate the federal securities laws merely by failure to disclose their own
mismanagement."); accord Santa Fe v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); Decker v. Massey-
Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Co.,98 the complaint alleged that the company's proxy solicitations were
materially deficient in failing to disclose that board nominees had par-
ticipated in a conspiracy "to thwart the labor laws of this country."99 In a
firm, correct decision, the court dismissed the claim, finding the nondis-
closures immaterial as a matter of law. Referring to the statement in
Maldonado v. Flynn that "illegal foreign payments" need not be dis-
closed so long as they are "intended for the corporation's benefit, '" the
court found that rule equally applicable to the conspiracy alleged in
Amalgamated. Noting that the SEC's own regulations require the disclo-
sure of only "criminal convictions and criminal proceedings,"'' the court
found that the "proxy rules simply did not require management to accuse
itself of antisocial or illegal policies."' '° A contrary conclusion was char-
acterized as "silly and unworkable.""1 3 The court recognized that man-
agement cannot be expected to confess to uncharged crimes in proxy so-
licitation materials. The rule, if it were construed to require disclosure of
unadjudicated illegality, would not succeed in bringing such information
to investors. Such an interpretation would not enhance the purposes of
the proxy rules, but merely would license retrospective litigation and fos-
ter insecurity in the tenure of management' 4
In contrast to the ambiguous Schlitz decision, the Amalgamated hold-
ing limited the breadth of integrity disclosure, linking the materiality of
omissions to either management self-dealing or adjudicated criminal
conduct.' 5 Without explicitly stating its intent, the Amalgamated court
sharply narrowed the disclosure obligations espoused in the 1976 Report
and the SEC's voluntary program.
SEC v. Chicago Helicopter Industries, Inc.'°6 expanded the Amalga-
98. 475 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980); see
GARY G. LYNCH & ERIC F. GROSSMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION PLANNING AND
STRATEGIES, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
WRONGDOING 15 (1998) [hereinafter LYNCH] (on file with The Catholic University Law
Review).
99. Amalgamated, 475 F. Supp. at 329.
100. Id. at 330-31 (citing Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d Cir. 1979)). The
Amalgamated court did not discuss or distinguish Schlitz, and did not reference the SEC's
qualitative materiality arguments contrary to its own opinion. See Branch, supra note 10,
at 1469.
101. Amalgamated, 475 F. Supp. at 332.
102. Id. at 331.
103. See id. at 332.
104. See id.
105. See Branch, supra note 10, at 1470; Ferrara, supra note 20, at 567 (discussing the
Schlitz decision).
106. No. 79-C-0469, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17214, (N.D. I11. Jan. 18, 1980) (vacated
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mated holding and further narrowed the SEC's qualitative materiality
theory. The SEC alleged that failure to disclose conduct in violation of
the National Bank Act created a material omission because "the transac-
tion reflect[ed] adversely upon the integrity of management, thus ren-
dering it an important factor in shareholders' investment decisions.',
10 7
Nonetheless, the Commission admitted that "the transaction ... had no
significant impact on the financial well-being of the bank, thus eliminat-
ing the possibility of 'financial materiality.""0' 8 The court concluded that
financial well-being and past determinations of illegality are important to
the reasonable investor and measurable, but that application of the dis-
closure rules to "alleged unethical or antisocial conduct would rob the
rule[s] of [any] objective basis."'09 The court said that "in the absence of
an adjudicated finding of illegality ... [it was] not at liberty to assume or
make its own finding of... illegality."" °
In Chicago Helicopter, a court for the first time rejected the SEC's ar-
gument that management integrity is material and should be disclosed.
The court said that the conduct in question did not reflect quantitative
materiality, self-dealing, or adjudicated illegal conduct."'
The Gaines v. Haughton"2 decision contains a discussion of the at-
tempted overlay of a qualitative standard of materiality on the proxy
rules."' In Gaines, the court refused to require disclosure of a range of
pursuant to settlement Mar. 7, 1980).
107. Id. at *4-5.
108. Id. at *3 n.2.
109. Id. at *7. The court favorably cited a speech by former SEC Commissioner
Roberta S. Karmel in which she expressed concern that a qualitative standard of material-
ity would cause the SEC to perform too great an enforcement role with respect to com-
pany disclosures. See id. at *10 & n.5 (citing Commissioner Roberta S. Karmel, Qualita-
tive and Differential Disclosure, Remarks to Financial Executives Institute International
Conference, Atlanta, Ga. (October 17, 1979), and Annual State-Federal Cooperative En-
forcement Conference, Denver, Co. (October 19, 1979)); see also Karmel Cites Trend away
from Economic Materiality as Disclosure Problem for both SEC and Business, 526 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) at A-8 (Oct. 31, 1979). She also envisioned such a standard would
require company employees to announce their own illegal acts. See Chicago Helicopter,
1980 LEXIS 17214, at *10.
110. Chicago Helicopter, 1980 LEXIS 17214, at *9.
111. See Branch, supra note 10, at 1474 (discussing the holding in Chicago Helicopter
and its impact on the SEC's policy requiring disclosure of qualitatively material informa-
tion bearing on management integrity).
112. 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981).
113. See id. In contrast, the court in Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd. held under
similar circumstances that the district court erred in dismissing without discovery a com-
plaint under Rule 10b-5 that alleged the company's annual report contained misleading
statements about management and its financial condition; the report failed to state that
the company's foreign subsidiaries made undisclosed, illegal payments totaling thirty mil-
lion dollars over a five year period. See Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111,
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Lockheed Aircraft Corporation management misconduct, including over
thirty million dollars of foreign payments which may have met with in-
vestor disapproval.14 Affirming dismissal of a section 14(a) claim based
on nondisclosure of corrupt foreign payments, the court stated that
"[t]he distinction between 'mere' bribes and bribes coupled with kick-
backs to the directors makes a great deal of sense, indeed, is fundamental
to a meaningful concept of materiality under [section] 14(a) and the
preservation of state corporate law.""..5  Only the latter behavior evi-
dences "dishonesty or deceit which inures to the direct, personal benefit
of the directors-a fact that demonstrates a betrayal of trust to the cor-
poration and shareholders and the director's essential unfitness for cor-
porate stewardship.""' 6 The self-dealing nature of the conduct was held
to require disclosure.
The Schlitz and Gaines decisions, and those decided in the interim,
were issued between June 1978 and through May 1981, a period closely
paralleling the April 1977 through March 1981 tenure of SEC Chairman
Harold M. Williams. During Williams's service, courts consistently re-
jected the concept of qualitative materiality. Moreover, his tenure was
marked by (a) contentions within the Commission, (b) a noticeable tide
turning against the SEC in federal courts, (c) the emergence of a corpo-
rate governance notion threatening "to eliminate the separation of po-
litical and economic power on which a private enterprise system de-
pends,""7 and (d) the end of the voluntary disclosure program.
Under Williams's leadership, the Commission attempted to develop
regulatory standards through law enforcement initiatives. Prior. to the
1970s, the SEC rarely lost court cases. It litigated in a zone of prece-
dents, generally receiving favorable responses from the courts. Courts
showed deference to the agency's views. In the late 1970s and early
1980s however, the SEC began to lose cases at a previously unheard of
118-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that the Gaines decision is inconsistent with prior case law
concerning financial materiality but that it is consistent with authority addressing self-
dealing conduct); see also Branch, supra note 10, at 1476. The Gaines case has not gone
without other criticism:
Gaines purports to establish a per se rule of immateriality for director misconduct
without the element of self-dealing -- at least for proxy statements. The opinion
seems to rest on the rather cynical assumption that shareholders, in exercising
their rights of corporate suffrage, care plenty about a management that is stealing
from the company, but are concerned not a whit about a management that is
stealing for the company. (emphases omitted).
Longstreth, supra note 19, at 6.
114. See Gaines, 645 F.2d at 765.
115. Id. at 778.
116. Id. at 779.
117. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 166 (1982).
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pace. 118 The losses were accompanied by a loss of credibility.
The Williams Commission was marked by rivalries, particularly con-
cerning the issue of qualitative materiality."9 Williams's promotion of
independent directors on boards and committees was deemed desirable.
However, his view regarding corporate governance-"the corporation
ha[d] ceased to be private property" and had become a "quasi-public"
institution without the rights of a "self-perpetuating oligarchy that consti-
tutes management"2owas denounced by corporate America.
Finally, the minority view of Commissioner Roberta Karmel on quali-
tative materiality prevailed in the courts. While Williams's and Sporkin's
successors were credited with dismantling qualitative materiality, it was
the pioneering work of Karmel, Freeman, and Kripke, and their argu-
ments for the rule of law and objective standards of materiality that were
the rationales cited by the courts rejecting the qualitative concept.
Despite the impact of the 1976 Report, the SEC's voluntary program,
and the Williams Commission, by 1981, courts sharply rejected the SEC's
expansive concept of materiality and returned to a more exacting con-
struction of statutory law.
VI. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
Although the Commission's efforts to establish a qualitative standard
of materiality were denounced, and the Commission exceeded its legisla-
tive charter, its efforts forever heightened the legal standards of corpo-
rate America. A practical reality of the SEC's efforts is that by 1981,
multinational corporations had adopted codes of business ethics and had
taken steps to implement and enforce the policies. For example, corpo-
rate internal audit staffs were expanded to police corporate irregularities.
Also, audit committees increased their oversight responsibilities of cor-
porate accounting practices and their liaison with independent auditors.
These efforts improved global business standards.
Congress held hearings to review the findings of the SEC concerning
corrupt practices. Congressional discontent with the startling number of
bribes which were disclosed fueled the drafting and passage of the For-
118. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (reversing the lower court's finding for
the SEC); International Bhd, of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (rejecting the
SEC's amicus curiae argument); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) (affirming the lower
court's finding against the SEC).
119. See KARMEL, supra note 117, at 230-38.
120. Harold M. Williams, Corporate Ethics, Address at the American Assembly 16
(April 16, 1977) (transcript available at The Catholic University Law Review).
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eign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).12 ' The SEC played a major role in
that legislative initiative. By enacting the FCPA, Congress expressed its
intent "to bring.., corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public confi-
dence in the integrity of the American business system.'
22
The FCPA amended provisions of the Exchange Act. The Exchange
Act contains books, records, and internal control requirements, as well as
anti-bribery provisions. The accounting provisions apply only to SEC
registrants. In contrast, the anti-bribery provisions apply to domestic en-
tities and to SEC reporting companies and issuers. Moreover, directors,
shareholders, officers, agents, and employees of a corporation subject to
the FCPA are individually subject to the Exchange Act, while foreign of-
ficials are not liable as bribe recipients."'
The accounting provisions have served for twenty-one years as the
nexus for expanding the duties of corporate accounting staff. The provi-
sions have promoted an ongoing debate concerning the obligations of
outside auditors to detect fraud.24 The provisions are cited regularly in
the charging paragraphs of SEC complaints alleging financial fraud. On
the other hand, the FCPA anti-bribery provisions have an awkward place
in the law that is designed to protect investors and to assure the integrity
of our capital markets. It is not reasonable to expect prosecution under
those provisions to be an enforcement priority. Lawsuits for off-shore
bribery will not have such "actual significance" to "reasonable share-
121. See Randall, supra note 41, at 664.
122. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977). For the legislative history of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, see Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The FCPA re-
flected five objectives developed by Congress in response to the corruption revealed by
the Watergate hearings and the SEC's voluntary program; (1) payment of bribes was con-
trary to the values of American citizens; (2) Congress wanted to eradicate the scandals
that bribery created; (3) Congress wanted to eliminate the distortion of international,
commercial competition that bribery caused; (4) Congress wanted to limit the spread of
corruption to foreign governments; and (5) Congress wanted to improve the United
States' reputation for honest business dealings. See Tamara Adler, Comment, Amending
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A Step Toward Clarification and Consolidation,
73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1740, 1745 (1982).
123. See generally Gary M. Brown, Exchange Act Registration and Reporting: What a
Public Company Should Know, in NUTS AND BOLTS OF SECURITIES LAW 127, 159-63
(1997); Michael R. Geroe, Complying with U.S. Antibribery Laws, 31 THE INT'L LAW.
1037, 1037-39 (1997) (discussing the punitive aspects of the FCPA).
124. See generally ACCOUNTING CHANGES, supra note 86; THE AUDITOR'S
RESPONSIBILITY TO DETECT AND REPORT ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES, Statements
of Auditing Standards No. 53 (American Inst. Of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988); CON
2, supra note 86; CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT,
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82 (American Inst. Of Certified Pub. Accountants
1997). These standards are the highest standards that typically apply to an independent
auditor.
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holders" to justify devoting enforcement staff to their prosecution.
FCPA bribery actions have no impact on the integrity of our capital
markets. The occasional anti-bribery action over the past twenty-one
years has been an enforcement yawn.
A. The FCPA 's Books, Records, and Internal Controls Provisions'
25
Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and (B) are the accounting and bookkeeping
provisions of the FCPA. They were enacted to assure that companies
make and keep their books, records, and accounts in a manner that facili-
tates their compliance with the disclosure obligations under the securities
laws."' The rules promulgated by the SEC specify that "[n]o person shall
directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to b[e] falsified, any book, record or
account subject to section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act."'27
The rules also state that a director or officer of an issuer may not make
"a materially false or misleading statement, or... [o]mit to state,... any
material fact ... in connection with (1) any audit or ... (2) the prepara-
tion or filing of any . . . report required to be filed with the Commis-
sion. ' "8 The FCPA also requires issuers to maintain a system of internal
accounting controls to ensure that issuers have reliable information from
which to prepare disclosure documents.'29
B. The FCPA's Anti-Bribery Provisions3 °
The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions render illegal any payments to
foreign officials, officials of foreign political parties, or any agent acting
for a foreign official or political party made for the purpose of influenc-
125. See generally Michael D. Mann & Maria L. Sachs, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act -
Books and Records Requirements: Enforcing Corporate Integrity, in INT'L SECURITIES
MARKETS 303, 305 (1997) [hereinafter Mann]; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1997, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-17500, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,632H (Jan. 29, 1981)
(address by Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, before
the SEC Developments Conference of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants).
126. See Mann, supra note 125, at 306-07; see also Exchange Act, § 13(b)(2)(A), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1994) (requiring issuers to "make and keep books, records, and
accounts, which ... accurately ... reflect the transactions and dispositions of... assets").
127. SEC Rule 13b2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (1998).
128. SEC Rule 13b2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2.
129. See Exchange Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b). A chief purpose of the internal
controls provisions, mirroring the goals of the voluntary disclosure program, is to afford
issuers a means to detect and prevent questionable payments to foreign officials, and to
ensure that their books accurately reflect the business. See Mann, supra note 125, at 309.
130. See Matt T. Morley & Yan Liu, De-Greasing the Wheels of Commerce: U.S. Anti-
Bribery Initiatives Signal Stiffening FCPA Enforcement, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1997, at 2.
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ing, obtaining, or retaining business."' Charges under the FCPA arise
from domestic entities using interstate commerce and corruptly paying
foreign officials for the purpose of influencing official acts in order to ob-
tain or retain business.'32
VII. A RETURN TO PRINCIPLES OF QUANTITATIVE MATERIALITY
Prior to 1981, the pressure for the SEC to retreat from its qualitative
materiality initiatives came largely from outside the Commission.'33 The
denunciation by respected attorneys and the judicial decisions rejecting
the standard were the most obvious external pressures. Investor indif-
ference also greeted the SEC's initiatives. Passage of the FCPA made
illegal many of the foreign payments of the type uncovered and disclosed
prior to 1977. Self-policing by corporate America improved the level of
legal standards in international and domestic trade. Corporate bribery
was assumed to be subsiding. As a result, the momentum for a qualita-
tive standard had dissipated by 1980 when Ronald Reagan was elected as
President.
In 1981, personnel changes at the SEC resulted in a reexamination of
the standard. The Commission's failure to approve an enforcement ac-
tion against Citicorp, and adverse decisions in two criminal cases, has-
tened the demise of the qualitative standard. The criminal actions were
brought without consultation with the SEC staff and in the face of deci-
sions in civil actions renouncing the standard.
VIII. DECEMBER 1981-JUNE 1983: CITICORP, THE SEC'S REJECTION OF
QUALITATIVE PRINCIPLES, AND CONGRESS OBSTRUCTS A
RESURRECTION
In 1981, following a three-year investigation, the Commission voted
not to initiate an enforcement action against Citicorp for its failure to
131. See Exchange Act § 30A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2.
132. See Exchange Act § 30A, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a); see also John M. Fedders, The
"Reason to Know" Standard - A Troublesome Ambiguity in the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., July 1981, at 2. The anti-bribery provisions
exempt certain payments, such as those made to facilitate the performance of "routine
governmental action[s]" by a foreign official, from liability under the FCPA. See Ex-
change Act § 30A, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b). Routine governmental actions include tasks
such as obtaining licenses, providing police protection, and processing visas.
133. See Branch, supra note 10, at 1450-51; cf. 1976 Report, supra note 72, at 30.
134. See Branch, supra note 10, at 1450-51 (citing Playing the Money Game, TIME,
Mar. 1, 1982, at 67 (reporting that the presence of SEC Chairman John S.R. Shad and Di-
vision of Enforcement Director John M. Fedders suggested that the SEC would no longer
view itself as an enforcer of management conduct)).
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disclose transactions designed to avoid local currency, tax, and foreignexchnge ... 135
exchange restrictions. Although the negative vote has no legal prece-
dent, the histrionics associated with the Commission's deliberations re-
veal that the vote assured the decline of the qualitative standard and a
change in SEC policy. The ensuing pandemonium following the leak of
the SEC's nonpublic decision, the media's Commission-bashing, and the
subsequent congressional hearings36 point to a House subcommittee as
being responsible for trivializing SEC enforcement and the qualitative
standard. The matter also is significant, to an SEC voyeur, because the
SEC's investigative files, internal memoranda, and the transcripts of its
nonpublic meetings were published during the congressional hearings.'37
A. Enforcement Recommendation and Opposition
In May 1978, the Commission approved a formal order of investigation
into Citicorp's failure to disclose foreign currency trades conducted byCitianks Eropen banc " 138
Citibank's European branch offices. The allegations that the company
engaged in "parking" transactions were based on the offices reselling
currencies to branches in the Bahamas for repurchase at a later point.39
The SEC was tipped off by an employee in Citicorp's Paris office141 who
believed that the office was engaging "in a practice of circumventing
European exchange control laws and tax laws by causing the New York
and Nassau branches of Citibank... to record on their books thousands
of non-arm's length, structured transactions as arm's length foreign ex-
change purchases/sales or as deposits.'
4'
135. See Milton V. Freeman, The SEC and the Citicorp Case: The Legal Issue of Mate-
riality, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 15, 1982, at 20 [hereinafter Freeman Citicorp] (stating that the
Citicorp matter is "important because it seems to mark the definitive abandonment of the
commission's post-Watergate adventure and [a] return to the principles that governed the
SEC in the first 40 years of its existence").
136. See generally SEC and Citicorp Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce of the United States House of Rep-
resentatives, 97th Cong. (1982) [hereinafter Citicorp Hearings I]; SEC and Citicorp; Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce of the United States House of Representatives, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter
Citicorp Hearings II].
137. See, e.g., Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136; Citicorp Hearings II, supra note 136.
138. See Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 96-108, 265. The Commission vote in
favor of the formal order of investigation was 5-0, including an approving vote of Commis-
sioner Karmel. See id. at 108; see also Freeman Citicorp, supra note 135, at 120 (describing
the transactions at issue in the Citicorp investigation).
139. See Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 104, 266; see also Branch, supra note
10, at 1477 (discussing Citicorp and its ramifications on enforcement policy).
140. See Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 15, 263.
141. Id. at 264.
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Foreign exchange income was then a line item in Citicorp's financial
statements and, in the years in question, represented between 15% and
35% of Citibank's net income. In SEC filings, Citibank discussed certain• 142
risks involved in foreign exchange trading. The SEC staff concluded
that during the period of 1974-78 Citibank earned $417 million from for-
eign exchange, and that at least $46 million was generated by parking
transactions. 143 The staff also decided that the complete risks of those
transactions were not disclosed to Citicorp's shareholders.144 Signifi-
cantly, the staff's determinations were reached despite no actual proof of
illegality concerning any transaction, but instead were based on a mere
belief that such transactions were highly questionable.4
In 1981, as the Citicorp investigation was being concluded, John S.R.
Shad, a wise chieftain, was confirmed as SEC Chairman. Shortly thereaf-
ter, Sporkin, who was prepared to recommend the initiation of an ad-
ministrative proceeding against Citicorp, resigned from the SEC. 46 In
June 1981, John Fedders was appointed Director of the Division of En-
forcement.
In Fall 1981, the new Director was urged by his staff to endorse an en-
forcement recommendation against Citicorp. After a debate, he was
confronted by the dilemma of a recommendation for a proceeding pro-
moted by Sporkin which the new Director believed to be unsupportable
in fact and in law. He recognized that if he exercised his authority and
stopped the recommendation from proceeding to the Commission, his
decision would be controversial, likely be leaked to the press, and receive
a politically charged reaction. He permitted the Enforcement staff to
make its recommendation and to include his opposition.
147
148
On December 9, 1981, the Division's memorandum was sent to the
142. See id. at 263, 274.
143. See id. at 264. The investigation took over forty-two months. It was based on
documents collected by a law firm that conducted an inquiry of Citibank's questionable
practices on the foreign exchange market, and the testimony of Citibank employees. See
id. at 30, 42-43.
144. See id. at 264.
145. See id. at 288; see also Freeman Citicorp, supra note 135, at 20 (stating that, al-
though an Associate Director recommended filing proceedings against Citicorp, he testi-
fied that he had not acquired proof that Citicorp violated the laws of foreign countries and
he had not gathered expert opinions certifying the illegality of any Citicorp transactions).
146. See Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 16; Freeman Citicorp, supra note 135,
at 20 (explaining Sporkin's views regarding Citicorp immediately before his departure
from the Commission).
147. See Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 33; Freeman Citicorp, supra note 135,
at 20.
148. See Citicorp Hearings 1, supra note 136, at 261.
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Commission with the Director's opposition. 149 The recommendation was
for an administrative proceeding charging noncompliance in Citicorp's
periodic reports with section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and the rules
promulgated thereunder. However, Citicorp was not to be charged with
fraud or with false statements in proxy materials. The staff argument was
based on Citibank's efforts to evade various European tax and exchange
control laws, its efforts to disguise those activities from auditors and gov-
ernment authorities, and its tampering with books going "to the heart of
the securities laws in that it expose[d] the corporation to substantial risks
... and ... impact[ed] the corporate accountability system."'5 ° The rec-
ommendation concluded that although Citicorp was not required to
make public statements about its foreign exchange activities, what it did
say was materially misleading and incomplete. 5' The Director's opposi-
tion was based on an opinion that the legal theory underlying the rec-
ommendation was contrary to prevailing law, and that, even if illegal, the
conduct did not, and was not likely to, result in significant economic
harm to Citicorp or reflect poorly on the integrity of management. His
152opposition also was based on a lack of proof of the alleged illegalities.
On December 18, 1981, the Office of the General Counsel and the Di-
vision of Corporation Finance joined in the Enforcement Director's op-
position. They concluded that Citicorp's filings were not misleading,
and "that the information the Enforcement staff would have ... included
or emphasized" was not material . They contended that because Citi
corp had never represented that its senior management had "honesty and
149. See id. at 33, 288; see also Freeman Citicorp, supra note 135, at 20.
150. Citicorp Hearings 1, supra note 136, at 285.
151. See id. at 285. See generally TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438
(1976); Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981); Amalgamated Clothing and Tex-
tile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); SEC v. Chi-
cago Helicopter Indus., Inc., No. 79 C 0469, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17214 (N.D. 11. Jan.
18, 1980); Berman v. Gerber Prod. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); SEC v. Jo-
seph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
152. See Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 288; see also Branch, supra note 10, at
1478 (discussing Fedders's response to Citicorp and the standard of materiality used in the
decision not to file an administrative proceeding).
153. See Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 292; Freeman Citicorp, supra note 135,
at 21 (reporting that the Director of Corporation Finance and General Counsel joined
Fedders in recommending against bringing an administrative proceeding).
154. Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 304.
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integrity," it had no duty to disclose breaches of those standards.
B. Commission Deliberations
On December 22, 1981, two issues were posed to the Commission.'
The first issue was whether, absent an express rule requiring disclosure,
Citicorp was obligated to disclose all material facts, including question-
able practices and risks, regarding each line item in the financial state-
ments contained in its periodic reports. The second issue was whether,
even though no affirmative statements were made in Citicorp's periodic
reports other than itemizing foreign exchange income as a separate line
item, the company's reports were rendered false and misleading by fail-
ing to disclose its questionable currency, tax, and foreign exchange prac-
tices and the risks related thereto.'56 The Commissioners discussed
whether the undisclosed risks were either qualitatively or quantitatively
material, and whether the level of proof was sufficient to support the
charge. The SEC then declined to initiate action against Citicorp by a
three to one vote."5 Chairman Shad and Commissioners Philip Loomis,
Jr. and Bevis Longstreth voted against, and Commissioner John Evans
voted in favor of, an action; Commissioner Barbara Thomas was recused.
Early in 1982, both the Commission's decision and staff memorandum
were leaked to the New York Times. In the ensuing pandemonium,
media reports questioned whether the Shad Commission was devoted to
an aggressive enforcement program, or whether the Citicorp decision
evidenced an intention to go soft on corporate America.59 The reports
155. See id. at 261.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 305-33. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency also investigated
Citicorp's alleged parking transactions. It did not bring any legal action at the time it con-
cluded its investigation in December 1980. Instead it told Citicorp to cease the practices.
See id. at 44; cf Freeman Citicorp, supra note 135, at 21; Branch, supra note 10, at 1477-78
(describing the Commission's conclusions that (1) involvement in the Citicorp matter was
not warranted due to lack of materiality and (2) the stance taken by the Division of En-
forcement during the SEC's voluntary disclosure program was not supported by case law).
158. See Jeff Gerth, S.E.C. Overruled Staff on Finding That Citicorp Hid Foreign Prof-
its, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1982, at Al; see generally Steven Brill, What Price Loyalty, THE
AMERICAN LAWYER, Aug. 1982, at 1 (noting that the SEC enforcement division lawyer
Thomas VonStein's memo detailing his investigation into Citibank's foreign exchange
transactions was leaked to a New York Times reporter); Susan Dentzer et al., The Citi
Never Sleeps - But Does the SEC?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 1982, at 61 (reporting that the
documents leaked to the New York Times may have contained information suggesting that
the SEC overlooked illegal practices of the Citibank corporation); Roy Rowan, The Mav-
erick Who Yelled Foul at Citibank, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 1983, at 46 (detailing the story of
David Edward's investigation into the practices of Citibank).
159. See Richard L. Hudson, Flabbier Cop? SEC May Be Losing Its Former Tough-
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lacked any analysis of the rationale underlying the decision, and the dis-
torted impressions caused the Commission concern. So great were the
concerns that on March 5, 1982, the SEC took the unprecedented step of
issuing a press release announcing the factors that influenced its decision
not to bring the case and requested the opportunity to provide an ac-
count of its handling of the matter before a congressional committee.16
Six factors were stated as influencing the decision not to bring the Citi-
corp case. The second factor was that "[e]ven if established, the alleged
amounts for the years in question were not material to Citicorp;" and the
fourth factor was that "[t]he law concerning disclosure of unadjudicated
allegations is unclear. There would have been a serious possibility of
court reversal of the Commission's action, which would have been bad
precedent. '16.
C. Congressional Hearings
The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives investigated
the SEC's decision.1 2 Congressional staff reviewed thousands of pages of
the nonpublic investigative and deliberative files. There were clandes-
tine staff efforts at the SEC to aid that investigation, somehow hoping
they would prove the Commission's decision to be incorrect.
On September 13 and 17, 1982, the subcommittee held hearings."' Its
Chairman, John Dingell, began by stating that
what is most important about the Citicorp matter is what it sig-
nifies for the Commission's role in assuring that level of man-
agement integrity which is so vital to the proper functioning of
the American free enterprise system. In rejecting a recommen-
ness, Some Observers Think, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1982, at 1; Richard L. Hudson, SEC
Enforcement Chief to Ease Pressure for Disclosure if Charges Are Unproven, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 8, 1982, at 4; Kenneth B. Noble, The Dispute Over the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, April 21,
1982, at D1.
160. See, e.g., Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 334-35.
161. Id. The other factors were the following: first, "[t]he allegations were not ade-
quately established"; third, "[tihe Comptroller of the Currency had concluded that no ac-
tion was warranted under U.S. banking laws"; fifth, "[tihe matter was essentially a banking
or tax case, not a securities case;" and sixth, "[tihe case was old. The practices in question
occurred in 1973 to 1978." Id.
162. See generally Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136. Cf. Bruce E. Fein, Independent
Agency Privilege: A Constitutional Imperative to Resist Congressional Encroachments
On Agency Functions, Remarks Before the Federal Legal Council, Airlie Foundation,
Airlie, Virginia (Oct. 17, 1983), reprinted in Bruce E. Fein, Fighting Off Congress: A Bill of
Rights For the Independent Agency, DISTRICT LAW., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 36.
163. See generally Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136 (providing a complete transcript
of the hearings and of the documents introduced into the record).
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dation to bring an enforcement action against Citicorp, the
Commission overturned long-established precedents and intro-
duced new criteria for disclosure. 6
Of course, the securities laws provide no role to the Commission in as-
suring management integrity. Chairman Dingell was incorrect in sug-
gesting that the SEC was introducing new criteria for disclosure.' In-
stead it was returning enforcement policies to long-established disclosure
criteria and away from those which were being renounced by courts.
Dingell said the Citicorp case revealed that "a clear pattern of events has
emerged showing there has been a fundamental shift in the attitude of
the Commission toward its responsibilities., 166 In fact, except for the
sharp disparity on the qualitative standard, the differences on enforce-
ment issues between the Shad Commission and its predecessor were
scant.167
At the first two days of the hearings, Sporkin, the Associate Director,
and the staff attorney in the Division of Enforcement responsible for the
Citicorp investigation were among six witnesses. The SEC staff ac-
knowledged the judicial decisions which opposed the theories supporting
the recommendation and recognized that the SEC lacked both proof that
Citicorp violated foreign laws and expert opinions certifying the illegality
of the transactions.169 On June 28, 1983, the subcommittee held a further
164. Id. at 1-2.
165. George Orwell said that political language "is designed to make lies sound truth-
ful and murder respectable, and to give the appearance of solidity to pure wind."
POLITICS AND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.
166. Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 2.
167. See Robert M. Bleiberg, Carrot or Stick? The SEC Finally May Be Getting Its Pri-
orities Straight, BARRONS, March 15, 1982, at 11 (explaining the SEC's decision not to pro-
ceed against Citibank for alleged misconduct); Jerone Idaszak, Get-Tough SEC a Welcome
Sight, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Oct. 18, 1982, at 49 (noting the SEC's intention to redouble
its efforts on insider trading); Michael R. Klein, Media Critics Show Misunderstanding of
SEC's Role, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 1983, at 8 (discussing the shift in the enforcement divi-
sion of the SEC since Shad and Fedders assumed their roles); Arthur F. Mathews &
Douglas G. Thompson, Commission's Enforcement Program: The Uncertainty Is Over &
All Is Well, N.Y. LAW J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 29 (noting that the Enforcement Division of the
SEC would continue to be a premier administrator of the Federal Government enforce-
ment program, due, in large part, to Fedders becoming the new enforcement chief); Nancy
L. Ross, SEC Defends Enforcement Rate, WASH. POST., Oct. 20, 1982, at D8 (noting that
only eight percent of SEC investigations involved insider trading); Nancy L. Ross, Shad:
SEC Is Doing More, With Less, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1983, at D9 (reporting that, between
1981 and 1982, the SEC was involved in thirty-one percent more actions).
168. See Citicorp Hearings 1, supra note 136, at 14-53, 94-95, 109-21, 125-31, 189-92,
210-14, 239-59.
169. See id. at 47, 94; Freeman Citicorp, supra note 135, at 20.
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hearing that included testimony from Citicorp."0 The company's repre-
sentatives provided a critique of the SEC investigation memorandum re-
garding Citicorp.
The unstated purpose of the hearings was to level scorn at the Com-
mission. But the criticism was petty, and what happened to the Commis-
sion before the House subcommittee was politics. It was a civics lesson
not taught in schools. The subcommittee trivialized the SEC law en-
forcement process and the issue of qualitative materiality. The hearings
were a disservice to investors. Those at the SEC opposing a Citicorp ac-
tion were promised,171 but never given, an opportunity to testify before
the subcommittee."' From the time the hearings were scheduled, the
SEC staff prepared for an intellectual discussion of qualitative material-
ity. The Commission was anxious to debate its ideas outside of an en-
forcement action. However, it was robbed of that opportunity because
the congressional hearings were nearly without any substantive discus-
sion of materiality. If it had not been for the questions of a minority
member of the subcommittee, Bob Whittaker,73 no one would have un-
derstood that legal precedent and the absence of evidence guided the
Commission not to act against Citicorp.
The stated purposes of the hearings were never fulfilled. Without the
presence of SEC Commissioners, there was never an explanation of the
rationale underlying the Citicorp decision. The Citicorp hearings ful-
filled neither the objective of providing oversight of the activities of an
independent agency nor the goal of providing examination of the need
for legislation.
IX. 1982: COMMISSIONERS' AND STAFF'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT
QUALITATIVE MATERIALITY
During the eighteen month span of the congressional investigation and
hearings concerning Citicorp, two Commissioners and one staff member
delivered speeches concerning qualitative materiality.
A. Evans on Disclosure of Business Ethics
In June 1982, Commissioner Evans delivered an uncharacteristically
170. See Citicorp Hearings II, supra note 136, at III (listing the Citicorp officers who
gave testimony before the Congressional Committee).
171. See Citicorp Hearings I, supra note 136, at 33-34.
172. See id. at III (listing hearing dates and names of those who testified).
173. See id. at 30-52.
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strident speech promoting disclosure of management integrity.'74 Al-
though he did not refer to Citicorp by name, he harshly attacked an SEC
staff memorandum opposing the action. Evans expressed support for a
qualitative standard of materiality and declared that
[i]nformation may be qualitatively material if it is relevant to
the competency or the integrity of management. This could in-
clude such things as... questionable or illegal activities of man-
agement .... It must be obvious that because qualitative mate-
riality deals with factors that are harder to measure, such as
competence and integrity, it is much more difficult to deter-
mine. Despite the fact that the law with respect to qualitative
materiality is unsettled, many investors consider the quality of
management to be the most important factor in their decision-
making.'
No other Commissioner has ever proclaimed "quality of management"
information to be the most important factor in many investors' decision
making.
Evans quoted from the Office of General Counsel's and the Division
of Corporation Finance's opposition to a Citicorp action: "it would be in-
appropriate to allege disclosure violations based on unadjudicated illegal
or improper conduct by a company's officers and directors unless there
were affirmative representations as to managements' honesty and integ-
rity in some document."'76 Evans denounced that view on the basis that
it did not reflect "an official Commission position" or the view of all SEC
staff. 177 He declared he could not "readily accept the concept that there
is no implied representation of management honesty or integrity,' ' 17 8 and
added that
[i]f some kind of representation is thought to be necessary,
rather than suggesting that management should not be held ac-
countable to disclose illegal acts unless there is an affirmative
representation as to its honesty and integrity, it would seem
more appropriate that management be held accountable unless
there is a prior negative representation as to its honesty and in-
174. See generally John R. Evans, Thoughts on Business Ethics In A Private Enterprise
System, NEWS (SEC, Wash., D.C.) June 21, 1982 (address to the New York Chapter of
Brigham Young University Management Society in New York, New York).
175. Id. at 5.
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tegrity." 9
Evans's speech was more substantive and combative than were his com-
ments at the Commission's December 1981 closed meeting when the de-
cision was reached not to initiate a proceeding against Citicorp.'8
B. Longstreth on Disclosure Regarding Management Integrity and His
Senate Reconfirmation Testimony
In October 1982, Commissioner Longstreth addressed SEC disclosure
policy regarding management integrity."' With keen insight into inves-
tors' interests, he was uniquely qualified for the task.
His remarks are the most comprehensive by a Commissioner regarding
that subject. Longstreth suggested that in light of the voluntary disclo-
sure program, the 1976 Report, and the Citicorp decision, the SEC
needed to refine its views concerning disclosures of management integ-
rity.1 2 He described the SEC's rulemaking authority in the area of self-
dealing as contrasted with generic management integrity.' Longstreth
emphasized that the SEC is not unconcerned with management integrity,
but recently is observing the legal limits of disclosure requirements under
the securities laws more closely, as the SEC in the 1970s may have "ex-
ceeded those limits at times."'4 He argued that the Commission should
not mandate "line item disclosure of the ethical behavior of manage-
ment," because such a requirement would contribute "nothing of impor-
tance to investors." 185
In August 1982, Longstreth testified before a Senate committee at his
reconfirmation hearing to remain a member of the SEC. 186 He was ques-
tioned about the Citicorp matter and his vote not to commence an action.
The questions focused on whether the Commission considered charging
Citicorp with violations of the FCPA, and Longstreth responded that no
such recommendation had been made.8 7
179. Id.
180. See Citicorp Hearings 1, supra note 136, at 308, 322-23, 325-26.
181. See Longstreth, supra note 19, at 1.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 4-5, 8.
184. Id. at 13.
185. Id. at 13-14 (stating that with respect to a director describing how honest he or
she has been, "[n]o meaningful disclosure is likely to result").
186. See generally Nominations of Bevis Logstreth and James C. Treadway, Jr.: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. (1982)
[hereinafter Longstreth Hearing].
187. See id. at 24-25 (letter from Bevis Longstreth, Commissioner, Securities & Ex-
change Comm'n, to the Honorable William Proxmire, Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
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C. Enforcement Director's Speech on Failure to Disclose Illegal Conduct
The Director of Enforcement prepared testimony for the House Sub-
committee's Citicorp hearings. When that opportunity passed, the re-
marks became part of a November 1982 speech.' His premise was that
the SEC only should initiate enforcement actions where (1) failure to
disclose unlawful conduct violates traditional economic standards of ma-
teriality, (2) a company fails to disclose self-dealing or conflict of interest
transactions, (3) there is a failure to disclose information mandated by
SEC rules governing proxy materials, periodic reports, or registration
statements, and (4) when untrue statements of material fact are made, or
statements are rendered misleading by the omission of material facts. 89
Absent the foregoing, he asserted that the "Commission generally should
not utilize the antifraud provisions of the securities laws . . where there
is a failure to disclose conduct which may be considered qualitatively ma-
terial."190
The Director's views reflected the courts' sharp rejection of the unde-
fined concept of qualitative materiality and the prevalence of the views
of Freeman, Karmel, and Kripke. Although ignored by the pundits, the
Director's objective was to articulate a means for the SEC to achieve a
moral end without foregoing the rule of law; the Commission had the
means to do so. The Director articulated standards of objective, quantita-
tive materiality which allowed the SEC to police corporate failures to
disclose illegal behavior. By establishing the guidelines, he sought to
achieve this goal within the defined rule of law and without uncertainty.
The Director reasoned that information concerning illegal behavior is
not per se material to investors. However, it becomes material if such
behavior results in "quantitatively significant economic harm" to a com-
pany.'9 ' He maintained that if there is a "reasonable likelihood" that a
company's, or its management's, illegal behavior will have a "material
ing and Urban Affairs of August 18, 1982, responding to questions from Senator Proxmire
concerning the decision not to file proceedings against Citicorp).
188. See Fedders Remarks, supra note 4; see also Kenneth B. Noble, S.E.C. Shifts Its
View on Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1982, at D1; Robert A. Rosenblatt, SEC to Re-
verse Policy on Disclosure of Illegal Conduct by Companies, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1982, at
part IV, 1; James L. Rowe, Jr., SEC to Limit Pursuit of Unethical Conduct, WASH. POST,
Nov. 19, 1982, at Cl; see generally James D. Redwood, Qualitative Materiality Under the
SEC Proxy Rules and the Fifth Amendment: A Disclosure Accident Waiting to Happen or
Two Ships Passing in the Night?, 1992 WiS. L. REV. 315, 345-50 (1992) (discussing the Di-
vision of Enforcement's retreat under Fedders from requiring disclosure of qualitatively
material information concerning management integrity).
189. See Fedders Remarks, supra note 4, at 1-2.
190. Id. at 2.
191. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
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effect on earnings, assets or liabilities," the information warrants disclo-
sure. 92 Disclosure also is required when a "material amount" of a com-
pany's business is contingent upon the illegal behavior.193 Finally, with
respect to illegal corporate behavior, he said that disclosure of illegal
corporate conduct may be necessitated if a reasonable possibility exists
that discovery of the illegality will result in "expropriation of a material
amount of assets or... material criminal fines or civil damages.,
194
The Director acknowledged that his views differed from his predeces-
sor's concerning the need for enforcement actions in situations reflecting
failure to disclose qualitative information not specifically required to be
disclosed in SEC rules, not involving self-dealing, and not otherwise nec-
essary to prevent statements made from being materially misleading.
195
In those situations, he deemed enforcement action inappropriate.1 96
The Director's speech engendered debate with respect to the intended
message.'97 Sporkin responded that if the SEC is unwilling to sue com-
panies for certain disclosure deficiencies, "'that puts a lot of pressure"'
on corporate attorneys to disclose even less.'98 He maintained that the
new Director's narrow interpretation of materiality prompted newspaper
headlines to state, "SEC to Limit Pursuit of Unethical Conduct," and
Sporkin suggested that this perception of the SEC's enforcement agenda
was "'troublesome. ' ' ' 9
192. Id. (emphasis omitted) (explaining required disclosures in the context of illegal
corporate behavior).
193. Id. (emphasis omitted).
194. Id. (emphasis omitted).
195. See id.
196. See id. at 7 (asserting that the lack of case law reviewing the use of the anti-fraud
provisions to enforce qualitative disclosures intimates that enforcement is inappropriate).
197. See generally Richard L. Hudson, The Changing Face of the SEC, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 27, 1982, at 8 (discussing the Fedders Remarks and Sporkin's response thereto).
198. Id. (quoting Sporkin). But see Milton V. Freeman, Letters to the Editor, The
SEC: Guardian of the Law or Arbiter of Morality?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1983, at 23
[hereinafter Freeman Letter].
199. Hudson, supra note 197, at 8 (quoting Sporkin). Sporkin also said the narrow in-
terpretation of materiality could allow larger companies to effectively conceal more un-
ethical conduct than a smaller company. See id. Fedders's former law partner defended
strict adherence to quantitatively material disclosure principles stating that
[e]xcept for the period 1974-1976, one of the great attributes of the SEC... has
been its strict adherence to the law. The law gives the SEC authority to protect
investors against economic loss by a process of disclosure. It does not grant the
SEC broad legal authority to act as a commission on ethics, to discourage busi-
ness from engaging in "tawdry practices" or "questionable ventures" or to pre-
vent "unethical conduct" generally. It is fundamental that a law enforcement
agency.., must itself obey the law.
Freeman Letter, supra note 198, at 23 (defending the Commission's return to a narrow
[Vol. 48:41
Qualitative Materiality
X. UNITED STATES V. MATTHEWS: THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION
MATTER AND ANOTHER DRUBBING OF THE QUALITATIVE STANDARD
The Southland matter resulted in a precedent-setting 1986 decision of
the Second Circuit that reversed the conviction of an executive for failure
to disclose, in proxy materials soliciting his election as a director, that he
had approved the cover-up of payments of bribes to public officials.2°
Although the bribes were never paid, nevertheless there was evidence of
a conspiracy. The 1984 indictment represented the first time that the Jus-
tice Department or a United States Attorney's office had commenced a
prosecution on the theory that qualitative material management disclo-
sures must be made.201 The Second Circuit's 1986 decision was preceded
by an internal Southland investigation, followed by a grand jury investi-
gation, several indictments and trials, and an SEC investigation.2o2
A. Southland Internal Inquiry
In November 1976, Southland received a letter from the SEC request-
ing that the corporation determine whether it had participated in any
"illegal or questionably illegal transactions ... from January 1, 1969 to
the present" . 3 In 1977, Southland initiated an internal investigation that
it entitled the Business Ethics Review. It was conducted by Southland's
legal department under the supervision of the audit committee and with
the limited assistance of outside counsel, including Fedders. During its
course, inquiry was made into a $96,500 payment to an attorney. The in-
vestigators sought to determine whether any of the money was used to
bribe an unnamed employee of the New York State Tax Commission re-
garding sales taxes owed by Southland franchisees in New York.' °
definition of materiality against statements made by Wall Street Journal writer Hudson
and comments by Sporkin); cf. Hudson, supra note 197, at 8.
200. See generally United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
201. Neither the United States Attorneys' offices prosecuting the Matthews case nor
the Office of Independent Counsel prosecuting the case in United States v. Crop Growers
Corp., 954 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1997), sought the counsel of the SEC as to the efficacy of
the theories of qualitative materiality alleged in those cases. The appellate court in Mat-
thews commented on this omission. See Matthews, 787 F.2d at 45.
202. Due to Fedders's involvement in Southland's internal investigation during the
1970s, a congressional investigation and hearings and an SEC investigation were con-
ducted regarding his role in the inquiry. Most documents concerning those inquiries be-
came a matter of public record.
203. The Southland Corporation Investigation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Secu-
rities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 20 (1983) [herein-
after Fedders Testimony] (testimony of John M. Fedders, on June 28, 1983, concerning the
advice he provided as a private attorney to Southland in 1977 and 1978 with respect to
Business Ethics Review).
204. See id. at 26.
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The Audit Committee, along with the Southland legal department and
outside counsel, ultimately determined that the evidence was insufficient
to confirm any suspicion of wrongdoing in connection with the retention
and payment of the $96,500 fee to the attorney. They agreed not to in-
clude the legal fee matter in the written Business Ethic Review report,
but rather to present it to the Board of Directors. °6 After the report was
submitted and the topic was discussed at the January 1978 directors'
meeting, Southland decided there was no need to publicly disclose the
findings of its internal investigation.
B. Grand Jury Investigation of Southland
In 1979, a grand jury investigation began and continued for several
207years, not ending until August 1984. Fedders testified several times af-
ter joining the SEC in 1981. Litigation arose when Southland asserted
privileges as to a portion of the materials subpoenaed. In March 1982,
the discovery issues ended with a decision of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals0 8 which identified Arnold & Porter's role in the Business Ethic
Review.209 By June 1982, media speculation arose regarding Fedders's
role in the Southland internal investigation and reports that he had testi-
fied before the grand jury.2 ° The Subcommittee on Oversight and Inves-
tigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce began an
investigation in 1982 of Fedders's role in the Southland investigation."'
Despite Fedders's request for an open hearing regarding his role, the Jus-
tice Department prevailed upon Subcommittee Chairman John Dingell
205. See id. at 34-36. In addition to the lack of evidence of illegality, a factor contrib-
uting to the decision not to include the matter in the report was concern of a defamation
action if it was included. See generally David B. Fein & Bruce E. Yannett, Internal Inves-
tigations Can Result in Libel Suits, NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1998, at B8.
206. See Fedders Testimony, supra note 203, at 34, 36.
207. See generally Southland Corp. Officer Appealing Jail Term in Probe, WALL ST. J.,
April 26, 1983, at 6 (reporting jail term ordered for 'evasive answers' to a grand jury inves-
tigation of Southland).
208. See generally In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982).
209. See id. at 484 n.2.
210. See John Bennett, Top SEC Official May Be Haunted by Previous Role, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS, June 13, 1982, at 44 (on file with author); Richard L. Hudson & Stanley
Penn, Controversy About Possible Bribery Case Involves Chief of SEC's Enforcement
Unit, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1982, at 10.
211. See David Lauter, Congress Examining Fedders' Role, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1982, at
3; Ruth Marcus, Panel Asks Fedders Role in Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1982, at D6;
Janet Novack, Grand Jury Probes Southland Legal Fee, DALLAS TIMES HERALD, Aug. 4,
1982, at 1; House Panel, U.S. Prosecutors Probing Fedders' Role in Possible Payments
Case, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1401-02 (Aug. 6, 1982); Testimony Sought From
SEC's Fedders In a Probe of Possible Corporate Bribery, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1982, at 4.
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to hold the hearing in Executive Session to avoid prejudicial publicity. In
September 1982, Fedders testified before the subcommittee, but because
he had been instructed by Southland not to answer questions regarding
his legal work for the company, he did not answer questions regarding
the Business Ethics Review.212
In August 1982, the SEC began a twenty-five month inquiry to deter-
mine whether it should act with respect to allegations regarding the con-
duct of Southland. This matter included an investigation of Fedders's
role as outside counsel. Because of Fedders's position at the SEC, the
inquiry was conducted by the Commission's Atlanta Regional Adminis-
trator. More than 3,000 hours were devoted to the investigation; eight-
een witnesses testified or gave statements; and one witness was given
immunity pursuant to a Commission order. Fedders ultimately testified
in September 1982.
C. Indictment
In May 1983, an indictment was returned against Southland and one of
its employees.213 Later that month, Fedders's counsel was advised by the
prosecutors that "out of an abundance of caution," Fedders, along with
anyone else who participated in the preparation of the Business Ethics
Review, would be a "subject" of the grand jury investigation."' Given
such status, and the fact that his conduct was being called into question
publicly, Fedders notified the appropriate Senate and House committees
of his willingness to testify publicly.215 Southland also waived the appli-
cable privileges. On June 28, 1983, Fedders testified before the Sub-
committee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs about his role in the Southland Business Ethics Re-
212. See generally Executive Session of the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 97th Cong. (Sept. 8, 1982) (on file with
author); Ernest Holsendolph, Bribery Charge Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1982, at D2;
Kim Masters, Fedders Denies Thwarting Hill 'John Doe' Probe, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 13,
1982, at 1; SEC Official Doesn't Answer Panel's Questions, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1982, at
D10.
213. See Indictment, United States v. Southland Corp. and Eugene DeFalco (E.D.N.Y.
May 1983) (on file with author) [hereinafter Southland Corp. Indictment]; see also William
M. Carley, Southland Corp. and an Official Charged With Bribe Plan in New York Tax
Dispute, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1983, at 4.
214. Fedders Testimony, supra note 203, at 17-19; see also Mary Thornton, Chief En-
forcer at SEC Subject of Jury Probe, WASH. POST, May 30, 1983, at Al.
215. See Fedders Invites Hearing on His Role in Alleged Bribery Matter, 15 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep., at 1019-20 (June 3, 1983); SEC Official Offers To Give Testimony About South-
land, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1983, at 10; SEC's Top Cop Says He'll Testify Now, WASH.
TIMES, June 1, 1983, at 8B; Southland Tax Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1983, at D2.
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view.,,,
In September 1983, the indicted Southland employee pled guilty to
Travel Act conspiracy in return for his cooperation.217 A superceding in-
dictment was then issued against Southland, adding another of its em-
ployees, and charging conspiracy with the objectives of violating the
Travel Act and committing fraud upon the Internal Revenue Service.218
After a trial at which Fedders testified, Southland was found guilty only
of conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service. The jury was un-
able to reach a verdict with respect to the individual.1 9
In the early 1980s, Clark Matthews was asked to stand for election to
Southland's Board of Directors."O He asked counsel whether he should
disclose in the proxy solicitation his status as a subject of the grand jury
investigation."' He was told that his status did not require disclosure,
and no disclosure was made.222 Subsequently, Matthews was elected as a
Southland director.223 In August 1984, Matthews was indicted and the
Southland employee whose prior trial had resulted in a mistrial was rein-
224dicted. The first count charged Matthews with knowingly joining a
conspiracy to bribe New York State tax officials in violation of the Travel
216. See generally Fedders Testimony, supra note 203; Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Fedders
Defends Past Work for Southland in Two-Hour Session Before Senate Panel, WALL ST. J.,
June 29, 1983, at 18; Kenneth B. Noble, Fedders Denies Knowledge of Purported Bribery,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1983, at D8; Mary Thornton, SEC Official Denies Wrongdoing,
WASH. POST, June 29, 1983, at A4.
217. In a later case, the Second Circuit concluded that this employee stole for himself
$48,500 of the $96,500 legal fee. See United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir.
1986); see also William M. Carley, New Grand Jury Probes Southland Corp. For Alleged
Scheme to Bribe Tax Official, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14,1983, at 4.
218. See Indictment, United States v. Southland Corp. and S. Richmond Dole
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1983) (on file with author); Southland Executive Indicted; Grand Jury
Probe Continuing, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 3.
219. See Joseph P. Fried, Southland Guilty in Bribe Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1984, at
31; Larry Lekin, Southland Guilty In Bribery Case, WASH. POST, June 9, 1984, at C2; Mis-
trial Is Declared In Case of Executive From Southland Corp, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1984, at
3; cf Southland Corp. Officer Approved Bribe, Ex-Aide Says, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1984, at
20.
220. See Matthews, 787 F.2d at 44.
221. See id.
222. See id. (stating that Matthews's counsel and his partners did not believe that the
securities laws mandated that this information be disclosed).
223. See id.
224. See id.; Superseding Indictment, United States v. S. Richmond Dole & Clark J.
Matthews, II, at 1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1984) (on file with author). See generally Southland
Corp. Fined; Third Official Indicted in Probe of Bribe Plan, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 3, 1984, at
[Vol. 48:41
Qualitative Materiality
Act and the tax collection authority of the Internal Revenue Service.225
The second count contained a charge of violating section 14(a) of the Ex-
change Act and Rule 14a-9 by failing to disclose in the proxy statement
that Matthews "had engaged in a conspiracy to bribe New York public
officials and to defraud the United States. 226 In early 1985, Matthews
was tried and Fedders testified as a defense witness. Matthews was ac-
quitted on the first count, but convicted on the second securities count.227
228
He appealed, and in 1986, the Second Circuit reversed his conviction.
D. Appeal of Conviction
The Second Circuit framed the issue as "not whether the jury found
Matthews guilty of conspiracy in 1985, but whether Matthews should
have publicly pronounced himself guilty [in the proxy statement] in
1981, ''229 or whether Matthews should have pronounced himself guilty
three years prior to the indictment.2" The court focused on the language
of section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, and noted that the SEC's line item dis-
closure requirements in Regulation S-K, applicable to proxy statements
through Schedule 14A, require a candidate for director to disclose only
whether he or she has been convicted in a criminal proceeding within the
past five years or is now a named subject of a criminal proceeding.2 1 It
noted that courts "almost universally have rejected efforts to require that
management make qualitative disclosures that were not at least implicit
in the Commission's rules., 23 2  In addition to discussing the Fifth
Amendment implications of requiring a nominee to declare himself
guilty of an uncharged crime, the court ruled that nondisclosure of un-
225. See Matthews, 787 F.2d at 44; Redwood, supra note 188, at 353.
226. Matthews, 787 F.2d at 45.
227. See id. at 39.
228. See id. at 43.
229. Id. Exchange Act section 14(a) makes it unlawful for any person to solicit, or
permit the use of his name to solicit, any proxy "in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1994).
230. See Matthews, 787 F.2d at 43 (ruling that, "we find no merit in the Government's
argument that Matthews violated section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by not confessing that he
was guilty of conspiracy three years before he was indicted on that charge"). In addition,
the Second Circuit pointed out that no bribe took place. See id. at 40.
231. See id. at 43-44. Item 401(f)(2) of Regulation S-K states that a public company
must determine whether any of its directors, director nominees, or executive officers has
been convicted or named in a criminal proceeding during the previous five years and then
disclose that information if it is deemed material to that person's ability or integrity. See
17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f) (1998); see also Lynch, supra note 98, at 13 (analyzing the Second
Circuit's use of Item 401(f) of Regulation S-K in Matthews).
232. Matthews, 787 F.2d at 48.
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charged criminal conduct, which is not required by any SEC rule to be
disclosed, cannot be a criminal violation.233
E. SEC Findings
In September 1984, before Matthews' 1985 trial, the SEC staff con-
cluded its investigation of Southland and of Fedders's role in the Busi-
ness Ethics Review. The staff did not recommend an enforcement ac-
tion."' In its memorandum, the staff analyzed the issue of the materiality
of "management integrity 235 information and whether an enforcement
action should be filed against Matthews for the same conduct for which
he was under indictment."' The staff concluded that there was no legal
precedent supporting an action against Matthews for the conduct for
which he had been indicted.3 ' Also, the SEC found that Fedders neither
violated nor aided and abetted violations of the securities laws and that
he was instead a victim of a conspiracy between Matthews and a South-
land assistant general counsel.13' The Commission's action, while non-
public, was leaked to the press and reported.239
XI. UNITED STATES V. CROP GROWERS: A FINAL RENUNCIATION OF
THE STANDARD
240In United States v. Crop Growers Corp., the Office of Independent
233. See id. at 49; Lynch, supra note 98, at 13 (discussing the Second Circuit's concern
with the Fifth Amendment implications of Matthews's conviction).
234. See Confidential Action Memorandum from Michael K. Wolensky, Administra-
tor, Atlanta Regional Office, Securities and Exchange Commission, to The Commission,
84 (Sept. 10, 1984) (on file with author) (regarding The Southland Corporation).
235. Id.
236. See generally id.
237. See id. at 81-82.
238. See id.
239. See id.; J.H. Doyle, SEC Clears Official In Southland Bribe Probe, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1984, at 5B; Bruce Ingersoll & Laurie McGinley, Enforcement Chief of SEC Exon-
erated in Southland Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 4; Kenneth B. Noble, Fedders
Cleared by S.E.C. Staff, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1984, at D7; SEC Exonerates Fedders in
Southland Fraud Case, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1984, part IV, at 2; SEC Inquiry Backs Offi-
cial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,1984, at 32.
240. 954 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1997). Many other courts relied on the Matthews hold-
ing for the proposition that suspected criminal wrongdoing should not be the subject of
mandated disclosure until a violation is charged. See Lynch, supra note 98, at 13 (ex-
plaining case law relying on the Matthews holding); see also In re Teledyne Defense Con-
tracting Deriv. Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1369, 1383 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (relying on Matthews in
holding that, until conduct is actually charged as criminal, neither the investigation nor the
underlying conduct warrants disclosure). The court in Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc.,
814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987), ruled, in a civil securities fraud suit for damages, the Matthews
holding does not render any material information immune from disclosure. In that case,
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Counsel charged three defendants with failing to disclose in filings with
the SEC
(a) that Crop Growers violated [the Federal Election Campaign
Act ("FECA")] by making illegal campaign contributions; (b)
that a material contingent liability existed for potential criminal
and civil fines because of said violations; (c) that Crop Growers'
financial statements were misleading; (d) that Crop Growers
maintained false books and records; and, (e) that Crop Grow-
ers, its subsidiaries, and their key officers faced criminal and
civil sanctions
that could affect its ability to operate.24 ' The defendants also were in-
dicted for making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and the court
noted that the majority of circuits had determined that a violation of §
1001 based on concealment, necessitated that the defendant must have
possessed a legal duty to disclose the facts at issue at the time of the al-
leged concealment.242 The defendants cited Matthews in support of their
argument that Crop Growers possessed no duty to disclose that it vio-
lated the FECA by making illegal campaign contributions or illegally
maintaining false books or records.
The court dismissed the counts alleging disclosure failures and found
that "Matthews . . . is a logical extension of the omission/duty princi-
ples.",244 The holding is consistent with the Matthews notion that, "so long
however, the court concluded that the conduct did not warrant disclosure. See id. at 26.
The Ninth Circuit, however, in California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v. Francis-
can Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1987), declined to follow the First Cir-
cuit's ruling in Roeder. The court said that fraud could occur only if the entity breached an
"independent duty" (e.g., fiduciary or statutory) by not disclosing. Id.; cf In re Par Phar-
maceutical, Inc. Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668, 674-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (duty to disclose that
FDA approval had been obtained through bribery); Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp.,
720 F. Supp. 241, 249-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (duty to disclose that vocational school had en-
couraged students to obtain funding to be paid to the school with fraudulent loan applica-
tions).
241. Crop Growers, 954 F. Supp. at 344; see also Lynch, supra note 98, at 17-18 (de-
scribing the counts in the indictment).
242. See Crop Growers, 954 F. Supp. at 344. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) provides that
[w]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudu-
lent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or docu-
ment knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or
entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
Id.
243. See Crop Growers, 954 F. Supp. at 347 (explaining the defendants' argument that,
under Matthews, they had no duty to disclose uncharged criminal conduct).
244. Id. at 346.
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as uncharged criminal conduct is not required to be disclosed by any rule
lawfully promulgated by the SEC, nondisclosure of such conduct cannot
be the basis of a criminal prosecution. 21 5 The Crop Growers court stated
that "the SEC clearly knows how to write specific disclosure require-
ments into its regulations, and has chosen not to do so for uncharged
criminal conduct. 2 46 The court concluded, in conformity with the Second
Circuit in Matthews, that Item 401(f) of Regulation S-K does not require
the disclosure of uncharged criminal conduct.247
XI. CONCLUSION
The qualitative materiality standard has come and gone. It died at the
bar of common sense. It was a standard that had no standards. Outside
of its SEC proponents, it had no champion. Its intended beneficiaries-
investors-ignored corporate qualitative disclosures. Moreover, the
standard was pronounced unfit for use by the courts because it licensed
the Commission to allege disclosure failures for unadjudicated miscon-
duct, or the like, based on its own discretion, not by the rule of law.
What is interesting about the qualitative materiality initiative and the
questionable corporate payments and practices era of the 1970s is what
has survived the demise of these policies.
The Commission. The SEC is almost always effective in accomplishing
its goals. It has functioned on an even keel for sixty-four years, even
through dramatic political and economic changes. Its purpose is to pro-
tect investors from fraud, and its focus is the wants and needs of inves-
tors. However, through its qualitative materiality initiatives, the Com-
mission abandoned its focus and exceeded its statutory authority. Now,
it no longer pursues its qualitative materiality theories.248 It may have
blithely abandoned respect for legal precedent, but it is wrong to think
that those initiatives weakened the agency. Its great stature continues
unabated, yet, notwithstanding the Commission's good faith undertaking
of those initiatives and its successful institution of improved corporate
standards, law enforcement extremism in the defense of investor protec-
245. United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
246. Crop Growers, 954 F. Supp. at 346; Lynch, supra note 98, at 18 (analyzing the
Crop Growers court's discussion of Matthews).
247. See Crop Growers, 954 F. Supp. at 347 (explaining that, with respect to Item
401(f), the court's "own examination of the language" led it to the same conclusion
reached by the Matthews court); Lynch, supra note 98, at 19; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f)
(1998).
248. "Governments will always do the right thing-after they have exhausted all other
possibilities." John Fund, Politics, Economics, and Education in the 21st Century, 27
IMPRIMIS, May 1998, at 1, 2.
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tion is a vice. To remain a premiere law enforcement agency, the SEC
must obey the law and attend to the economic interests of investors.
The Commission is movement, not monument. One is dynamic, the
other is lifeless. The pioneering enforcers were vigorous. Their vitality
helped to explain the appeal and permanence of the agency. It is those
who will call themselves SEC enforcers, who will commit themselves to
enforcing the securities laws to avoid permitting their inspired movement
from becoming uninspired monument.
The Rule of Law. The tendency of the law must always be to narrow
the field of uncertainty, so that citizens may know by what standards
their conduct will be judged. The securities laws are broadly stated and
provide the SEC great discretion in the exercise of its law enforcement
responsibilities. Despite that discretion, the Commission must avail
every opportunity to specify what conduct is illegal4 9 Due process in-
tends that market participants are entitled to be judged by discernable
standards of which they have fair notice. All SEC rules should therefore
bespeak fair notice. The Commission should be unwilling to establish
new rules through enforcement action, and should always expose its new
theories through rulemaking. The qualitative materiality enforcement
initiatives were not preceded by rulemaking or by fair notice of the dis-
closure standards to which registrants would be held.
The Commission's failure in enforcement actions to identify the stan-
dards applicable to alleged violations again has become a problem.5 In
1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, which has jurisdictional review authority over SEC administra-
tive orders, 2 held that Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission's Rules of
Practice 252 fails to establish a standard for determining when accountants
engage in "improper professional conduct., 253 Ordering dismissal of one
249. One ground specifically asserted by the Supreme Court, in favor of a narrow
reading of Rule 10b-5 liability, is found in Chiarella v. United States. See 445 U.S. 222, 235
n.20 (1980) (stating a concern that the broad reading proposed by the dissent "would raise
questions whether either criminal or civil defendants would be given fair notice that they
have engaged in illegal activity").
250. See Paul Beckett, Lack of SEC Rules Irks Appeals Courts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
1998, at B7.
251. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77i(a), 78y(a)(1) (1994).
252. Rule 2(e) has become Rule 102(e). See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (1998); Amend-
ment to Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, Securities Act Release No. 33-
7593, 63 Fed. Reg. 57164 (1998).
253. Checkosky v. SEC, 139 F.3d 221, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (dismissing the lawsuit be-
cause even on remand, the SEC failed to articulate a standard by which to evaluate
whether professional conduct is improper); see also Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 454
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (remanding the case to the SEC for a determination of the standard for
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
such charge, the court declared that not only does the Commission "pro-
vide no clear mental state standard to govern Rule 2(e)(1)(ii), it seems at
times almost deliberately obscurantist on the question. ' '254  The court
chastised that "(t)here is no justification for the government depriving
citizens of the opportunity to practice their profession without revealing
the standard they have been found to violate." 5
The facts underlying reversal of this SEC administrative order reflect
an unwillingness by the Commission, similar to that demonstrated in the
1970s, to promulgate rules designed to fill in the details of the broadly
stated qualitative standard of materiality.2" The SEC exercises com-
manding police power when it arbitrarily determines disclosure require-
ments by refusing to establish clear guidelines.2" The SEC should not
hold companies to regulatory standards it has not made clear. Instead,
the Commission more often should use its rulemaking power to delineate
what constitutes appropriate conduct and then set standards for compli-
ance. If Congress wants the SEC to require disclosure of qualitative in-
formation, how are we to establish the morality, ethical, or unadjudicated
determining "improper professional conduct"). The SEC's administrative order in
Checkosky may reflect a return to Commission practices of the 1970s when it violated the
rule of law, exceeded its statutory authority through qualitative materiality initiatives, and
was unwilling to provide standards or definitions. The SEC must be vigilant not to return
to those prior habits.
254. Checkosky, 139 F.3d at 225.
255. Id. at 225-26.
256. When the media reported on Checkosky and other court decisions rejecting
Commission efforts to hold alleged disclosure violators responsible in the absence of an
SEC rule, the SEC's then General Counsel and now Director of the Division of Enforce-
ment, Richard H. Walker, was reported to have said "[w]e will of course pay attention to
what the court decisions say.., but.., you can't overregulate and micromanage, because
the system suffers when you do everything by rule." Beckett, supra note 250, at B7. The
securities industry suffers when the SEC fails to establish standards that would allow mar-
ket participants to determine by what standards their conduct will be judged. Although
the SEC's mission is critical to the integrity of our capital markets, its processes cannot
usurp the rights of individuals. The notion that people should trust federal officials be-
cause they are government employees has too often failed citizens' rights. Individual
rights must be the preeminent consideration in the creation of government initiatives.
257. See Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1035 (4th Cir.
1997) (addressing whether debt security markups were fraudulently excessive). The court
found it "puzzling," and said it was "acutely uncomfortable" with the SEC's amicus curiae
argument, that the Commission, having chosen not to require disclosure of markups under
Rule 10b-10, would argue for a judicially created disclosure rule under the general
antifraud rule, Rule 10b-5. See id. The decision is representative of a line of cases in
which judges have rejected SEC attempts to use enforcement actions or amicus participa-
tions in private litigation to develop regulatory standards appropriately established
through rulemaking proceedings or prospective policy announcements. Judges are in-
creasingly receptive to defense arguments that their clients failed to receive fair notice of
the standards by which their conduct would be judged.
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norms? What is the corporate behavior morality that we want disclosed?
Of course, we want our leaders to be ethical, but all ethics are not codi-
fied in law.
The Qualitative Standard. The rule is that corporations need not dis-
close unadjudicated violations of law or antisocial or unethical conduct
unless the information is quantitatively significant to investors and alters
the total mix of information made available. The compelled disclosure of
uncharged and unadjudicated criminal conduct would violate the Fifth
Amendment.
In awareness of this difficulty in 1982, the Director of Enforcement de-
fined standards of objective quantitative materiality by which the Com-
mission could initiate enforcement actions for the failure to disclose ille-
gal conduct. Those objective standards permit registrants to make
informed disclosure decisions, and provide a rule of law by which the
SEC can initiate enforcement actions for the failure to disclose illegal
conduct.
Investors. "They're in it for the dollars." Ordinarily, investors dismiss
ethical and moral norms when saving and investing. Investor education
lacks moral focus.
Investors are educated to save, invest, diversify, sell if dissatisfied, and
to avoid fraud. This education has caused investors to focus their in-
vestment analysis on assets, income, and earnings. Even in the 1970s, the
SEC undertook no effort to capture the interest of investors by educating
them about qualitative information analysis. It also failed to educate the
courts that investors use information about corporate moral norms.
Consequently, reports of bribes and kickbacks did not capture the inter-
est of investors, nor impact their saving and investing. Investors per-
ceived that the information was irrelevant to their economic decisions
and portfolios.
Why should investors' interest in the moral norms of corporate chief-
tains be any different from society's interest in the morality of elected of-
ficials? Most Americans tell pollsters that, even if President Clinton did
commit adultery, did lie about it, and did attempt to obstruct justice, he
should nevertheless remain in office.
The common interest of investors is a reasonable return on savings;
this economic interest is their sole focus. Thus, they are concerned with
information that helps them make decisions that they believe will add
value to their portfolios. Consequently, the SEC's disclosure policies
must be oriented to regulating according to quantitative standards, not
standards based on morality.
Corporate Conduct. The disclosures in the 1970s of bribes and payoffs
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shocked even the hardened cynic. However, the responsive undertaking
of voluntary self-examinations and promulgation of corporate codes of
conduct and internal mechanisms for policing those standards was im-
pressive. For better or worse, corporate morality will be driven by eco-
nomic return.21' Although disclosure of qualitative information failed to
influence investment decisions, the disclosures caused many enterprises
to alter their internal business practices. While the SEC made a valiant
effort to improve corporate conduct by instituting a qualitative standard
of materiality, the SEC's efforts to accomplish those goals violated the
rule of law, and thus could not be maintained.
The argument that the securities laws do not require disclosure of
qualitative information is not a suggestion that illegal conduct should be
condoned. As a society, we have achieved a consensus that bribes and
kickbacks are serious crimes-ones that have adverse effects on business
and society. There can be no reasonable argument supporting those ille-
gal acts. But, beyond its responsibilities under the securities laws, in-
cluding the FCPA, the SEC has no role in the prosecution of those who
engage in illegal or antisocial conduct.
"Workers, owners, managers, stockholders, and consumers are moral
agents in economic life. By our choices, initiatives, creativity and in-
vestment, we enhance or diminish economic opportunity, community
life, and social justice. ' " 9 Ethics must be upheld in business dealings.
Personal responsibility is essential.
The chief responsibility for policing corporate conduct falls upon
boards of directors. Pressure for ethical and moral behavior must come
from a sense of propriety that cannot be mandated by law. Instead, cor-
porations must depend upon their internal discipline and on their man-
agers to make moral decisions. Companies must expand their internal
controls for self-policing; sentences for criminal conduct can be reduced
if a corporation has internal compliance and supervision procedures
which are effectively implemented. Under circumstances where miscon-
duct is discovered, corporate directors have the responsibility to sanction
wrongdoers and correct corporate practices.
Those supporting the SEC's efforts to promote disclosure of qualita-
tive information ask how institutional behavior will be policed if not by
the SEC. In addition to internal corporate discipline and criminal prose-
258. "The genius of capitalism is that markets, not regulations or politics, force the
admission and correction of mistakes." Martin Mayer, Why Secrecy is Bad for Banking,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1997, at A10.




cutions, corporate wrongdoing will continue to be uncovered by securi-
ties analysts and investigative reporters. Misconduct will be revealed by
disgruntled employees, competitors, underwriters performing due dili-
gence investigations, and independent auditors and counsel. These
watch-dogs exercise significant oversight of corporate conduct.
The Future of Disclosure. There is always a need for the SEC to de-
velop new disclosure techniques for corporations to better report the
source from which they derive their value. We are witnessing a profit
migration away from products to services. Nonetheless, financial state-
ment presentations today do not provide information about how intellec-
tual capital adds value. To remedy this incongruence, the SEC should
develop a technique for reporting intellectual capital.
Markets cannot survive without transparency. Investors need informa-
tion about sources of profits, asset quality and location, and financing ac-
tivities. To the extent that companies confuse the market by distributing
misleading information, their operations and markets will suffer severe
disruption when a previously concealed truth unexpectedly is disclosed.
The same cannot be said about undisclosed facts regarding unadjudi-
cated corporate misconduct, or antisocial or unethical behavior. The
revelation of such information does not translate into stock market gains
or losses.
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